ABSTRACT. The problem of fair division of indivisible goods is a fundamental problem of social choice. Recently, the problem was extended to the case when goods form a graph and the goal is to allocate goods to agents so that each agent's bundle forms a connected subgraph. For the maximin share fairness criterion researchers proved that if goods form a tree, allocations offering each agent a bundle of at least her maximin share value always exist. Moreover, they can be found in polynomial time. We consider here the problem of maximin share allocations of goods on a cycle. Despite the simplicity of the graph, the problem turns out to be significantly harder than its tree version. We present cases when maximin share allocations of goods on cycles exist and provide results on allocations guaranteeing each agent a certain portion of her maximin share. We also study algorithms for computing maximin share allocations of goods on cycles.
INTRODUCTION
Fair allocation of indivisible goods is a fundamental problem of social choice [5, 3] . It assumes a set of elements, referred to as goods, and a collection of agents each with her own utility function on the sets, or bundles, of goods. The utility functions are commonly assumed to be additive and so it is enough to specify their values on individual goods only. The objective is to assign to agents disjoint subsets of goods in a way that meets some fairness criteria. Among the most commonly studied ones are proportionality and envy-freeness, adapted to the case of indivisible goods from the problem of fair allocation of divisible goods or cake-cutting [5, 11] , as well as recently proposed maximin and minimax share [6, 4] . For each of the criteria, it is of interest to identify classes of instances when fair allocations exist, to establish the complexity of deciding the existence of fair allocations, and to design algorithms for computing them.
In this paper, we focus on the maximin share criterion [6] . It is a relaxation of envy-freeness and proportionality, and has a natural interpretation in terms of some allocation protocols. In a few years since it was first proposed it has already received substantial attention. The criterion turns out to be highly non-trivial. First, while it is easy to see that envy-free and proportional allocations do not always exist, it is not at all clear whether the same is true for the less restrictive maximin criterion. We now know it is. But it took a few years before the first examples showing that maximin share allocations are not guaranteed to exist were found [12] . Moreover, they turned to be quite intricate. Further, the complexity of deciding the existence of maximin share allocations has not yet been determined [4] . To get around the difficulty of constructing maximin allocations, researchers proposed to relax the maximin share criterion by requiring that the value of each agent's share in an allocation be at least equal to some positive fraction of the maximin share. Procaccia and Wang [12] proved that an allocation guaranteeing agents at least 2/3 of their maximin share always exists, and that it can be found in polynomial time if the number of agents is fixed (not part of input). Both the result and the algorithm are based on deep combinatorial insights. Building on that work, Amanatidis, Markakis, Nikzad and Saberi [1] proved that for every constant ǫ, 0 < ǫ < 2/3, there is a polynomial-time algorithm finding an allocation guaranteeing to each agent at least (2/3 −ǫ) of A PRELIMINARY VERSION OF THE PAPER APPEARED IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF IJCAI 2018. 1 their maximin share (with the number of agents a part of the input). Ghodsi, Hajiaghayi, Seddighin, Seddighin and Yami [8] proved that in the results by Procaccia and Wang and by Amanatidis et al., the constant 2/3 can be replaced with 3/4.
We study maximin share allocations of indivisible goods in the setting proposed by Bouveret, Cechlárová, Elkind, Igarashi and Peters [2] . In the original problem, there are no restrictions on sets of goods that can be allocated to agents. This ignores important practical constraints that may make some sets highly undesirable. For instance, goods may be rooms and labs in a building to be allocated to research groups [2] , or plots of land to be consolidated [9] . In such cases, legal sets of goods that could be allocated to an agent might be required to form connected subgraphs in some graph describing the neighborhood relation among goods (offices spanning segments of a hall, plots forming contiguous areas of land).
Bouveret et al. [2] studied envy-free, proportional and maximin share allocations for that setting obtaining several interesting complexity and algorithmic results. Our paper extends their study for the maximin share criterion. In a striking positive result, Bouveret et al. [2] proved that maximin share allocations of goods on trees always exist and can be found in polynomial time. In our work we look beyond trees and show that as soon as the underlying graph has a single cycle, the picture becomes much more complicated. Our main contributions are as follows. 1. We show that for goods on a cycle the maximin share value for an agent can be computed in polynomial time. In two cases, when m ≤ 2n and when agents can be grouped into a fixed number of types (agents are of the same type if they have the same utility function), this allows us to design polynomial time algorithms for computing maximin share allocations of m goods (on cycles) to n agents or determining that such allocations do not exist. 2. We show that deciding the existence of maximin share allocations of goods on an arbitrary graph is in the class ∆ P 2 . For complete graphs (the setting equivalent to the original one) this result improves the bound given by Bouveret and Lemaître [4] . We further improve on this upper bound for cycles and more generally, unicyclic graphs by showing that for such graphs the existence of a maximin share allocation is in NP. 3 . We obtain approximation results on the existence of allocations of goods on a cycle that guarantee all agents a specified fraction of their maximin share value. While it is easy to show that for any number of agents there are allocations guaranteeing each agent at least 1/2 their maximin share, improving on the guarantee coefficient of 1/2 is a non-trivial problem. We show that it can be improved to ( √ 5 − 1)/2 (> 0.618). Further improvements are possible if we limit the number of agents or the number of types of agents. In particular, we show that for the three-agent case, there are allocations guaranteeing each agent 5/6 of their maximin share; for an arbitrary number of agents of up to three types there are allocations guaranteeing each agent 3/4 of their maximin share; and for any number of agents of t ≥ 4 types there are allocations guaranteeing each agent t/(2t − 2) of their maximin share. In each case, these allocations can be found in polynomial time. Moreover, the constants 5/6 and 3/4 for the cases of three agents and any number of agents of up to three types, respectively, are best possible, that is, they cannot be replaced with any larger ones.
DEFINITIONS AND BASIC OBSERVATIONS
A utility function on a set V of goods (items) is a function assigning non-negative reals (utilities) to goods in V . We extend utility functions to subsets of V by assuming additivity.
Following Bouveret et al. [2] , we consider the case when goods form nodes of a certain connected graph G = (V, E). We adopt the assumption of the connectedness of the graph for the entire paper and do not mention it explicitly again. In particular, whenever we use the term graph we mean a connected graph. We write V (G) and E(G) for the sets of nodes and edges of G and refer to G as the graph of goods. Given a graph G of goods, we will often refer to utility functions on (the set) V (G) as utility functions on (the graph) G.
Let V = V (G) be a set of goods. A G-bundle is a subset of V that induces in G a connected subgraph. A (G, n)-split is a sequence P 1 , . . . , P n of pairwise disjoint G-bundles such that
We use the term split rather than partition as we allow bundles to be empty. When G or n are clear from the context we drop them from the notation and speak about bundles and splits (occasionally, G-splits and n-splits).
Let G be a graph of goods, u a utility function on G, q a non-negative real, and n a positive integer. We call a split q-strong if every bundle in the split has value at least q under u. The maximin share for G, u and n, written mms (n) (G, u), is defined by setting mms (n) (G, u) = max{q : there is a q-strong n-split of G}.
An equivalent definition is given by mms (n) (G, u) = max
where the maximum is taken over all n-splits P 1 , . . . , P n of G. A split for which the maximum is attained is a maximin share split or an mms-split for n and u or for n and an agent with a utility function u. We often leave n and G implicit when they are clearly determined by the context. By the definition, for every bundle P in an mms-split for n and u, u(P ) ≥ mms (n) (G, u). Similarly as above, when G and n are clear from the context, we leave them out and write mms(u) for mms (n) (G, u). When considering an agent i with a utility function u i we write mms(i) for mms(u i ).
Let G be a graph of goods. A (G, n)-allocation is an assignment of pairwise disjoint G-bundles of goods to n agents 1, 2, . . . , n so that all goods are assigned. Clearly, (G, n)-allocations can be represented by (G, n)-splits, where we understand that the ith bundle in the split is the bundle assigned to agent i. Let u i be the utility function of agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A (G, n)-allocation P 1 , . . . , P n is a maximin share allocation, or an mms-allocation, if for every i = 1, . . . , n we have u i (P i ) ≥ mms (n) (G, u i ). To illustrate the concepts introduced above, let us consider the graph in Figure 1 . We will call this graph G. The graph G defines the set of goods {v 1 , . . . , v 8 } and their adjacency structure. The table in the figure shows three utility functions u 1 , u 2 and u 3 on the set of goods. The values of the utility function u 1 are also shown by the corresponding goods in the graph (it will facilitate our discussion below).
In our example, the set {v 1 , v 2 , v 6 , v 7 } of goods is a G-bundle (or, simply a bundle, as G is clear). Indeed, the subgraph of G induced by {v 1 , v 2 , v 6 , v 7 } is connected. On the other hand, the set {v 1 , v 2 , v 5 , v 6 } of goods is not a bundle as the corresponding induced graph is not connected. Further, the sequence {v 1 , v 7 , v 8 }, {v 2 , v 3 }, {v 4 , v 5 , v 6 } is a (G, 3)-split (or simply a 3-split). Indeed, all sets in the split are bundles. It is also easy to see that the sequence {v 1 , v 7 , v 8 }, {v 2 , v 4 }, {v 3 , v 5 , v 6 } is not a split as the set {v 2 , v 4 } is not a bundle.
Let us now consider the utility function u 1 . The total utility of all goods under u 1 is 18. Further, it is easy to see that 3-splits into bundles of value 6 (under u 1 ) do not exist. To this end, we note that v 1 and v 8 cannot be in the same bundle valued at 6 as their total value is 7. Thus, the bundle containing 
Thus, this 3-split defines an mms-allocation of goods on G to three agents with the utility functions u 1 , u 2 and u 3 . Later, we will also see examples when mms-allocations of goods on graphs (specifically, cycles) do not exist.
We now are ready to present a few basic results on the problem of the existence of mmsallocations. Two agents are of the same type if they have the same utility functions. The maximin share allocation problem is easy when all but one agent are of the same type. Proposition 2.1. Let G = (V, E) be a graph of goods. If we have n agents and at most one of them is of a different type than the others, then an mms-allocation exists.
Proof. The result is obvious for n = 1. Thus, we will assume n ≥ 2. Let u be the utility function of agents 1, . . . , n − 1 and u ′ a utility function of n. Let Π be an mms-split for u, and P a bundle
. Assign P to agent n. Next, allocate the remaining parts of Π to agents 1, . . . , n − 1 in an arbitrary way. Since for each bundle Q in Π, u(Q) ≥ mms(u), the resulting allocation is an mms-allocation.
In particular, this result applies to the case of two agents. Corollary 2.2. Mms-allocations of goods on a graph to two agents always exist. ✷ Let G = (V, E) be a graph of goods. An agent with a utility function u on G (a utility function u on G) is n-proportional if
We often omit n from the notation if it is clear from the context. A set {1, . . . , n} of agents (a set {u 1 , . . . , u n } of utility functions) is proportional if every agent i (utility function u i ) is nproportional.
An agent (a utility function) is n-regular if it is n-proportional and its maximin share (with respect to n) is 1. A collection of n agents (utility functions) is regular if every agent in the collection is n-regular. It is clear that for every agent in an n-element regular collection of agents, the total value of all goods for that agent is n.
Let c be a positive real. A bundle P ⊆ V is c-sufficient for an agent i if u i (P ) ≥ c · mms(i). An allocation Π = P 1 , . . . , P n is c-sufficient if for every i = 1, . . . , n, P i is c-sufficient for i. Clearly, a 1-sufficient allocation is an mms-allocation. The next result shows that when studying the existence of c-sufficient allocations (and so, in particular, mms-allocations) one can restrict considerations to the case when all agents are regular. We use it to prove Theorem 2.4 later on in this section but its full power becomes clear in Section 4. Proposition 2.3. Let G be a graph of goods and c a positive real such that for every regular collection of n agents (for every regular collection of n agents of at most t-types) a c-sufficient allocation exists. Then a c-sufficient allocation exists for every collection of arbitrary n agents (for every collection of arbitrary n agents of at most t types).
Proof. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents and {u 1 , . . . , u n } the set of their utilities. If for every i ∈ N, mms (n) (u i ) = 0, then the assertion holds. Any split of G into n bundles is a csufficient allocation.
Thus, let us assume that for at least one agent, say k, mms (n) (u k ) > 0. For each agent i ∈ N such that mms (n) (u i ) = 0, we change her utility function to u k . We denote the new set of utilities by v ′′ 1 , . . . , v ′′ n . It is clear that if P 1 , . . . , P n is a c-sufficient allocation with respect to the utility functions v ′′ i , then it is also a c-sufficient allocation with respect to the original utilities u i . It is then enough to prove that a c-sufficient allocation with respect to the functions v ′′ i exists. For every agent i ∈ N, we denote by Π i any mms-split into n bundles with respect to the utility function v ′′ i . For each bundle of Π i valued more than mms (n) (v ′′ i ) we decrease the value of some elements in that bundle to bring its value down to mms (n) (v ′′ i ). In this way, we produce a new utility function, say v
On the other hand, by the construction, for every bundle P ∈ Π i , v
Clearly, each utility function v i , i ∈ N, is n-regular. Moreover, it follows directly from the construction that if the original utility functions are of at most t types, then the resulting utility functions are of at most t types, too.
Let Π = P 1 , . . . , P n be a c-sufficient allocation for v 1 , . . . , v n (its existence is guaranteed by the assumption). Therefore, for every agent
Thus, Π is a c-sufficient allocation of goods to agents in N with respect to the utility functions v ′′ i and the result follows. Corollary 2.2 states that for two agents and for any connected graph of goods an mms-allocation exists. On the other hand, Bouveret et al. [2] gave an example of nonexistence of an mms-allocation for a cycle and four agents. In fact, as we show in Figure 2 , even for three agents it may be that mms-allocations of goods on a cycle do not exist. In that figure, v 1 , . . . , v 9 denote consecutive nodes of a cycle and the numbers in each row represent the utility functions. Observe that the maximin shares for the agents 1 and 2 are 5. For the agent 3, it is 6. Moreover, no two consecutive nodes have the total value satisfying any of the agents. Therefore, if an mms-allocation existed, it would have to be a split into three bundles of three consecutive nodes each. It is simple to check that none of the three possible partitions of this type is an mms-allocation. On the other hand, for three agents and at most 8 goods on a cycle mms-allocations always exist.
Theorem 2.4. For three agents and at most 8 goods on a cycle, mms-allocations always exist.
Proof. Let C be a cycle with at most 8 nodes and let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of agents. By Proposition 2.3, we assume without loss of generality that the agents are 3-regular. In particular, they are proportional and mms(i) = 1, for every i ∈ N.
Let us consider mms-splits for agents 1, 2 and 3, each into three bundles. By regularity, all bundles in those splits are non-empty. Thus, each split determines three edges that connect adjacent bundles of the split. Since C has 8 edges and there are three splits, there is an edge in C that connects adjacent bundles in two different splits, say for agents 1 and 2. It follows that for some bundles A and B of the mms-splits for agents 1 and 2, respectively, A ⊆ B or B ⊆ A.
Let us assume without loss of generality that A ⊆ B. Clearly, the elements of the set B − A can be added to one of the two other parts of the mms-split for the agent 2 to form a 2-split of the path C − A, say B ′ , B ′′ , with both parts of value at least 1 for the agent 2. We now construct an mms-allocation as follows. If the set A has value at least 1 for the agent 3, then she receives it. Clearly, the value of C − A for the agent 1 is equal to 2. Thus, one of the parts B ′ , B ′′ has value at least 1 to agent 1. We allocate this part to agent 1. Finally, the agent 2 receives the part that remains.
If A does not satisfy the agent 3, then the agent 1 gets this part. The value of C − A for the agent 3, is larger than 2. Thus, we allocate the parts B ′ , B ′′ to the agents 3 and 2 in the same way as to the agents 1 and 2 in the previous case.
We conclude this section with a comment on the notation. Formally, whenever we talk about allocations of goods on a subgraph of a graph we consider, we should use restrictions of the utility functions u i to the set of nodes of the subgraph. Continuing to refer to u i 's is simpler and does not introduce ambiguity. Therefore, we adopt this convention in the paper.
COMPLEXITY AND ALGORITHMS
We assume familiarity with basic concepts of computational complexity and, in particular, with the classes NP, ∆ P 2 and Σ P 2 . We refer to the book by Papadimitriou [10] for details. We start with general comments on how instances of fair division of indivisible goods on graphs are given. First, we assume any standard representation of graphs. As our primary objective is to understand when problems we consider have polynomial solutions and not most efficient algorithms to solve them, the details of how graphs are represented are not critical. Moreover, many of our results concern particular graphs such as cycles, when explicit representations of nodes and edges are not even needed. Finally, we assume that all utilities and other parameters that may be part of the input are rational, the least restrictive assumption for studies of algorithms and complexity.
We now formally define several problems related to maximin share allocations of indivisible goods on graphs and derive bounds on their complexity. MMS-VALUES-G: Given a graph G on m goods, a utility function u, that is, a sequence u = (u 1 , . . . , u m ) of non-negative rational numbers, an integer n > 1 and a rational number k ≥ 0, decide whether mms (n) (G, u) ≥ k.
The problem was studied in the original case (with G being a complete graph) by Bouveret and Lemaître [4] . Their complexity result and its proof extend to the general case. The hardness argument uses a reduction from the well-known NP-complete problem PARTITION [7] : PARTITION: Given a set U of m non-negative integers, decide whether there is a set X ⊆ U such that u∈X u = u∈U \X u.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. Indeed, to solve the problem, we guess an n-split and verify that each of its parts induces in G a connected subgraph that has value at least k (under u). The problem is NP-hard even in the case when G is a complete graph, n = 2 and the utility function is integer valued. We can show this by a reduction from PARTITION. Indeed, an instance of PARTITION consisting of a set of non-negative integers {u 1 , . . . , u m } yields an instance to MMS-VALUES-G with the complete graph of goods, n = 2, and k = ⌈(
It is easy to observe that an instance of PARTITION is a YES instance if and only if the corresponding instance of MMS-VALUES-G is a YES instance. Thus, NP-hardness follows.
Another related problem concerns the existence of an allocation meeting given bounds on the values of its individual bundles. ALLOC-G: Given a graph G on m goods, n utility functions u 1 , . . . , u n (each u i is a sequence of length m consisting of non-negative rational numbers) and n rational numbers q 1 , . . . , q n , decide whether an allocation A 1 , . . . , A n for G exists such that for every i = 1, . . . , n, u i (A i ) ≥ q i . Proposition 3.2. The problem ALLOC-G is NP-complete.
Proof. The membership in NP is evident. The problem is NP-hard even if G is a complete graph, n = 2, q 1 = q 2 , and u 1 = u 2 . Indeed, it becomes then the MMS-VALUES-G problem with G being a complete graph, n = 2, k = q 1 (= q 2 ), and u = u 1 (= u 2 ). Thus, the proof of hardness for Proposition 3.1 can be applied here, too.
We use these observations to show an upper bound on the complexity of the problem of the existence of an mms-allocation in the graph setting. We formally define the problem as follows. MMS-ALLOC-G: Given a graph G of goods and n utility functions u 1 , . . . , u n (each u i is a sequence of length m of non-negative rational numbers), decide whether an mms-allocation for G and u 1 , . . . , u n exists. Proof. The key step in the proof is the observation that we can rescale each utility function so that all its values are integers. To this end, given a utility function u i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we compute the product, say k i , of all denominators of the rational numbers used by u i as its values. Next, we multiply all values of u i by k i to produce a new utility function u Let us denote by I the original input instance to the problem and by I ′ the instance obtained by rescaling the utility functions in the way described above. We note that the products k i and the rescaled utility functions u
, where M is the number of digits in the binary representation of the largest integer appearing as the numerator or the denominator in rational numbers specifying the original utility functions u i . Since the size, say S, of the input instance satisfies S = Ω(m + n + M), I
′ can be computed in polynomial time in S. Finally, we note that I is a YES instance of the problem MMS-ALLOC-G if and only if I ′ is a YES instance of the problem. In fact, an allocation Π is an mms-allocation for I if and only if Π is an mms-allocation for I ′ . Let us now consider an auxiliary problem where, given a graph G on m nodes and a sequence s = s 1 , . . . , s m of m non-negative integers (that is, a utility function), the goal is to compute mms (n) (G, s). We will design for this problem an algorithm with an NP-oracle. We will then show that our algorithm runs in polynomial time in the size of the representation of s, where we consider each call to an oracle to be a single step taking a constant amount of time.
To this end, we observe that Since the number of bits needed to represent a non-negative integer x is given by max(1, ⌈log 2 (x + 1)⌉, it follows that the size, say S ′ , of the representation of a problem instance satisfies S ′ ≥ m j=1 max(1, ⌈log 2 (s j + 1)⌉. Thus, the number of range-narrowing steps is bounded by S ′ . Consequently, the oracle algorithm we described runs indeed in polynomial time in S ′ . It follows that the problem MMS-ALLOC-G can be solved for an instance I by a procedure consisting of these three steps:
n are the rescaled utility functions computed in step (1). This is done using the oracle algorithm described above. It can be applied as all utilities in I ′ are integer-valued. We recall that I ′ can be computed in polynomial time in S (the size of the original instance I). Based on that and on our discussion of the auxiliary problem, step (2) of our algorithm also runs in polynomial time in S, counting each oracle call as taking a unit amount of time. Finally, the last step takes a single call to an oracle. Thus, the entire algorithm runs in polynomial time in S, where we count each oracle call as taking the unit amount of time. Since the oracles used by the algorithm are for NP-complete problems, the problem MMS-ALLOC-G is in ∆ P 2 . The upper bound ∆ P 2 established by Theorem 3.3 applies also in the case when G is assumed implicitly, for instance, when it is a path, a cycle or a complete graph represented by its set of nodes (but not edges). It is because the number of oracle calls is bounded by the size of the representation of the utility functions only. In the case of complete graphs, Theorem 3.3 yields an improvement on the bound Σ P 2 obtained by Bouveret and Lemaître [4] . We do not know if the upper bound of ∆ P 2 can be improved in general and, in particular, whether it can be improved for complete graphs. On the other hand, we do know that it can be improved for trees. Bouveret et al. [2] proved the following two results.
Theorem 3.4 (Bouveret et al. [2] ). There is a polynomial time algorithm that computes mms (n) (T, u) and a corresponding mms-split given a tree of goods T , a non-negative rational utility function u on the nodes (goods) of T , and an ingeter n ≥ 1.
Theorem 3.5 (Bouveret et al. [2] ). For every tree T of goods and every set of n agents with nonnegative rational utility functions on the goods in T , an mms-allocation exists. Moreover, there is a polynomial-time algorithm to find it.
The results we presented suggest a question of the relationship between the complexity of the MMS-ALLOC-G problem and the properties of the underlying graph, as it becomes more complex than trees. The first step towards understanding how the complexity grows is to analyze the case of cycles and unicyclic graphs.
First, we show that as in the case of trees (cf. [2] ), the maximin share values and mms-splits for the case when goods form a cycle (or a unicyclic graph) can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.6. There is a polynomial time algorithm for computing mms (n) (U, u) and a corresponding mms-split, where U is a unicyclic graph and u is a rational-valued utility function.
Proof. Using the rescaling technique discussed in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we can reduce in polynomial time the general problem to the problem when all utilities are integers. To this end, we compute the product, say k, of all denominators of the rational numbers that are values of goods under u (if all values are integers, we assume the denominator is 1; this applies, in particular, to the case when all utilities are 0). We then define a new utility function by multiplying the values of u by k. Once the maximin share value for the rescaled utility function is computed, it is then used as the numerator of the maximin share for u and k is used as the denominator. Thus, to complete the proof it suffices to describe a method of computing mms (n) (U, u) and an mms-split under the assumption that all values of u are integers.
Let C be the unique cycle of U. Every U-split has a bundle that contains C or is a split of the graph U − e for some edge e ∈ C. Thus,
where mms C stands for max
with the maximum taken over all splits P 1 , . . . , P n that have a bundle containing C. To compute mms C , we proceed as follows. We construct a tree U C by contracting C in U to a single "supernode," say c. Thus, the nodes of U C are all nodes of U − C and the supernode c. We define a utility function u ′ on the nodes of U C by setting
We note that U C and u ′ can be computed in polynomial time. Moreover, U C and all graphs U − e, e ∈ C are trees. We now apply the algorithm by Bouveret et al. [2] (cf. Theorem 3.4) to compute mms C and mms (n) (U − e, u), for all edges e ∈ C, as well as the corresponding mms-splits. This takes polynomial time. We then select the largest value among them and return it together with its mms-split (in the case, the largest value is mms C , in the bundle containing the superode, we replace it with the nodes of C).
It is now a matter of routine to show that the MMS-ALLOC-G problem for cycles and, more generally, for unicyclic graphs is in NP.
Corollary 3.7. The problem MMS-ALLOC-G for unicyclic graphs is in NP.
Proof. Let U be a unicyclic graph and u 1 , . . . , u n rational-valued utility functions defined on the nodes of U. The following non-deterministic polynomial-time algorithm decides the problem MMS-ALLOC-G: (1) guess an allocation P 1 , . . . , P n , (2) compute the values mms (n) (U, u i ), i = 1, . . . , n, and (3) verify that
. . , n. By Theorem 3.6, the step (2) can be accomplished in polynomial time. Thus, the entire algorithm runs in polynomial time.
We do not have an argument for NP-hardness of the problem MMS-ALLOC-G. Thus, we do not know whether the bound obtained in Corollary 3.7 is tight in general. We do know, however, that in some special cases it can be improved. We will now discuss these results.
Our first group of results is concerned with the case when the number m of goods is small with respect to the number n of agents, specifically, when m ≤ 2n. Our results rely on the following simple observation.
Proposition 3.8. Let C be a cycle, u a utility function on C, and n ≥ 2 an integer. For every node x of C, mms
Proof. Let Π be an mms-split of C for u and n. Let P be the bundle in Π containing x, and let P ′ and P ′′ be the two bundles in Π inducing in C segments neighboring the one induced by P , respectively preceding it and succeeding it when traversing C clockwise (P ′ = P ′′ if n = 2). We move all goods in P that precede x to P ′ and those that succeed x to P ′′ . In this way each bundle still spans a connected segment in C. Next, we remove the "new" P (at this point, P consists of x only). The result is a split Π ′ of C − x into n − 1 bundles, in which every bundle has value at least
We now are ready to show that, when there are m goods on a cycle and n agents, and m < 2n, then mms-allocations are guaranteed to exist. Moreover, we also show that this result is sharphaving exactly m = 2n goods allows for situations when mms-allocations do not exist.
Theorem 3.9. If m < 2n, then an mms-allocation of m goods on a cycle C to n agents exists and it can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let us consider agents 1, . . . , n with utility functions u 1 , . . . , u n . Let Π be an mms-split for the agent n. Clearly, for every bundle P ∈ Π, u n (P ) ≥ mms (n) (C, u n ). Since m < 2n, at least one bundle in Π consists of only one element, say x. It follows that u n (x) ≥ mms (n) (C, u n ). Since C − x is a path (and so, a tree), Theorem 3.5 implies that there is an allocation giving each agent j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, a bundle valued at least mms (n−1) (C − x, u j ). By Proposition 3.8, each such bundle is valued at least mms (n) (C, u j ). Thus, this allocation extended by the bundle {x}, allocated to the agent n, forms an mms-allocation of the goods on C to n agents.
For an algorithm, we (1) compute the maximin share mms (n) (C, u n ); (2) select an item x such that u n (x) ≥ mms (n) (C, u n ) (as argued above, such an x exists); (3) construct an mms-allocation of goods on the path C − x to agents 1, . . . , n − 1 (possible as C − x is a tree); and (4) extend the allocation constructed in (3) by giving {x} to n.
By our argument above, the allocation constructed in step (4) is an mms-allocation. Steps (1) and (3) can be accomplished in polynomial time by Theorems 3.6 and 3.5, respectively. The same obviously holds for steps (2) and (4). Thus, the algorithm we described runs in polynomial time.
This result is sharp. If m = 2n and n > 3 then an mms-allocation of m goods on a cycle to n agents may not exist as shown by the example in Figure 3 . Indeed, all maximin share values are n + 1. Thus, every bundle in any mms-allocation would have to contain at least two elements. Since m = 2n, every bundle would have to consist of exactly two elements. There are only two splits of a cycle with m = 2n nodes into n bundles of two consecutive goods. None of them is an mms-allocation. The assumption that n > 3 is essential. We have seen earlier that if n = 2 then mms-allocations exist for every number m of goods. Thus, they exist for m = 2n = 4. If n = 3, mms-allocations of m goods on a cycle exist for every m ≤ 8 (cf. Theorem 2.4). In particular, they exist if m = 2n = 6.
As our example shows, if m = 2n, there are cases when mms-allocations do not exist. However, whether an mms-allocation exists in the case when m = 2n can be decided in polynomial time and, if so, an mms-allocation can be computed efficiently.
Corollary 3.10. There is a polynomial time algorithm deciding the existence of an mms-allocation of 2n goods on a cycle to n agents, and computing one, if one exists.
Proof. Let C be the cycle and u 1 , . . . , u n the rational-valued utility functions of the agents 1, . . . , n. We first compute the values mms (n) (C, u i ), i = 1, . . . , n (cf. Theorem 3.6). If for some item x and agent i, u i (x) ≥ mms (n) (C, u i ), then reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3.9 one can show that an mms-allocation for C exists, and that it can be found in polynomial time. Otherwise, if there is an mms-allocation of goods on C to n agents, every bundle in this allocation consists of two consecutive goods. There are only two candidates for such allocations and one can check whether any of them is an mms-allocation in polynomial time (as the values mms (n) (C, u i ) are known).
The next result of this section concerns the case of n agents of t types, where t is fixed and is not a part of the input. Before we present our result and prove it, we discuss how inputs and outputs are represented.
As we already noted earlier, instances to an mms-allocation problem on a cycle are specified by a non-negative integer m representing the number of goods, and n m-element sequences of nonnegative rational numbers, each sequence representing a utility function. We note that m implicitly defines the goods as v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m , as well as the cycle as having these goods appear on it in this order. Further, we adopt a natural convention that for every i = 1, . . . , m, the ith element in every utility sequence provides the utility value for the good i. This representation consists of nm + 1 rational numbers (one of them, m, an integer). 1 In the case when agents can be grouped into t types, where t is fixed and not part of input, the case we are now considering, input instances can be represented more concisely by a non-negative integer m, t sequences of m non-negative rational numbers (t utility functions) and t non-negative integers s 1 , . . . , s t , where each s r represents the number of agents of type r (that is, having u r as their utility function). Thus, an instance consists of tm = Θ(m) rational numbers represented by pairs of integers, and t + 1 = Θ(1) integers. We will use M to denote the length of the binary representation of the largest of the integers appearing in this representation, and S to denote the total size of the binary representations of the integers in the instance. In particular, we have that
We observe that if n > m, then the maximin share for each agent is 0 and, consequently, every allocation of m goods to n agents is an mms-allocation. Since t is fixed, computing n = s 1 +. . .+s t takes time O(M) and, consequently, also O(S). Thus, this case can be recognized in time O(S) and then handled directly. Namely, we return a sequence of t 0's as the maximin shares for agents of types 1, 2 . . . , t and, if an mms-allocation is required, we allocate all goods to agent 1 and empty bundles of goods to all other agents. We do not generate any explicit representation for this allocation. It is implicitly identified by the all-0's output of the maximin shares. This is to avoid having to output explicitly an n-element sequence of bundles, as n, the length of this sequence, may be exponential in the size of input. It follows that the key case is then the case n ≤ m. Theorem 3.11. For every integer t ≥ 1, there is a polynomial time algorithm deciding existence of an mms-allocation of m goods on a cycle to n agents of t types (and computing one, if one exists).
Proof. Let us consider an instance to the problem given by an integer m (the number of goods), t sequences u 1 , . . . , u t , each consisting of m non-negative rational numbers (t utility functions), and t non-negative integers s 1 , . . . , s t (the numbers of agents of type 1, . . . , t, respectively). We start by computing n = s 1 + s 2 + . . . + s t , which can be accomplished in O(S) time, as t is fixed (we recall that we write S for the size of the input instance). The case n > m has been discussed above.
Thus, in what follows we assume that n ≤ m. An important consequence of this assumption is that for every r = 1, . . . , t, s r ≤ m.
To decide whether there is an mms-allocation and, if so, to compute it, we compute the values q r = mms (n) (C, u r ), r = 1, . . . , t. Since t is fixed, Theorem 3.6 implies that all these values can be computed in time bounded by a polynomial in |u|, where |u| represents the largest size of the representation of an input utility function and, consequently, also by a polynomial in S.
We now observe that an allocation Π of goods on C to agents of t types given by u 1 , . . . , u t is an mms-allocation on C if and only if for some edge e of C, Π is an allocation of goods on the path C − e to these agents such that for every agent of type r, the bundle P ∈ Π allocated to that agent satisfies u r (P ) ≥ q r .
Thus, to prove the assertion, it is enough to show that the following problem has a polynomialtime solution: Given a path F of m goods v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m , appearing in this order on F , t rationalvalued utility functions u 1 , . . . , u t , t non-negative integers s 1 , . . . , s t such that n = s 1 + . . . + s t ≤ m, and t non-negative integers q 1 , . . . , q t , find an allocation Π of goods on F to s 1 + . . . + s t agents such that for every agent of type r, the bundle P assigned to that agent satisfies u r (P ) ≥ q r . 1 We note that we do not include the number of agents, n, in the input; if we need it, we can compute it by counting in the input the sequences representing the utility functions.
To describe our method, we define H to be the set of all sequences (h 1 , . . . , h t ) such that for every r = 1, . . . , t, 0 ≤ h r ≤ s r . Clearly, the number of sequences in H is bounded by (
. . , h t ) ∈ H and h r > 0, where 1 ≤ r ≤ t, then we write H − r for the sequence (h 1 , . . . , h r−1 , h r − 1, h r+1 , . . . , h t ) which, we note, also belongs to H.
For a sequence (h 1 , . . . , h t ) ∈ H, we define T (h 1 , . . . , h t ) to be the smallest j such that there is an allocation of goods v 1 , . . . , v j to h 1 + . . . + h t agents, exactly h r of them of type r, 1 ≤ r ≤ t, so that each agent of type r obtains a bundle worth at least q r . If such an allocation does not exist, T (h 1 , . . . , h t ) is set to ∞.
Next, for every j = 1, . . . , m and every r = 1, . . . , t, we define k(j, r) to be the minimum
We will show that T (h 1 , . . . , h t ) can be efficiently computed. Clearly, T (0, . . . , 0) = 0 (there are no agents to get any bundles and so, even the empty path suffices). Thus, let us consider H = (h 1 , . . . , h t ) ∈ H and let us assume that h 1 + . . . + h t > 0. Let us define I = {r : h r > 0, 1 ≤ r ≤ t}. It is easy to see that
Assuming that all values k(T (H − r ), r), for r ∈ I, are known, T (H) can be computed in time O(t) = O(1). It follows that with the initial value of T (0, . . . , 0) = 0, considering sequences H ∈ H in any order consistent with non-decreasing sums of their elements and using the formula (1) to compute T (H), one can compute T (s 1 , . . . , s r ) in polynomial time, in fact, in time O(S max(2,t) ) (we recall that all values k(j, r) can be computed in time O(S 2 ); also, the number of entries in T is O(S t ) and each entry can be computed in O(1) time). If T (s 1 , . . . , s t ) = ∞, then there is no split Π of F such that for every agent of type r, its bundle P ∈ Π satisfies u r (P ) ≥ q r . Otherwise, T (s 1 , . . . , s t ) = ∞ and a split solving the problem exists. Moreover, it can be computed in the standard way for dynamic programming algorithms. To this end, each time the formula (1) is applied we have to record an index r ∈ I that minimizes the expression k(T (H − r ), r)). This information allows us to construct the split in polynomial time in S.
As all algorithmic tasks we presented can be accomplished in time bounded by a polynomial in S, the assertion follows.
We close this section with yet another corollary to Theorem 3.6. It concerns a possibility of regularizing utility functions on unicyclic graphs in polynomial time by converting a method used in the proof of Proposition 2.3 into an algorithm. Let us call a collection {u 1 , . . . , u n } trivial if for every i, mms (n) (u i ) = 0. We will call all other collections non-trivial.
Corollary 3.12. There is a polynomial time algorithm that, given a unicyclic graph U of goods, and a non-trivial collection of rational-valued utility functions u i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, on U, produces a rational-valued regular collection of utility functions u ′ i on U such that for every c, if a split Π is a c-sufficient allocation with respect to u ′ i 's then it is a c-sufficient allocation with respect to u i 's. If the original utility functions are of at most t types, then the resulting utility functions are of at most t types.
Proof. The algorithm follows the method we used in the proof of Proposition 2.3. It consists of the following key steps.
(1) Rescale the utilities u i as described in the proof of Theorem 3.3 to produce an equivalent collection of integer-valued utilities w i (by equivalent we mean determining the same splits as mms-allocations). (2) Compute the maximin shares ; repeat for all goods as long as it is possible to decrease a value of some utility function on some good. . The correctness of the method, both for the main statement and under the restriction to utility functions of at most t types, follows from the argument used to prove Proposition 2.3. For the running time, we note that step (1) runs in polynomial time (we argued this in the proof of Theorem 3.3).
Step (2) runs in polynomial time (Theorem 3.6).
Step (3) runs in time O(nm). Next, we note that the argument we used in the proof of Theorem 3.3 to estimate the running time of the "range narrowing" binary search and the fact that the maximin shares can be computed in polynomial time (Theorem 3.6) together imply that step (4) runs in polynomial time.
Step (5) consists of O(nm) additions and multiplications involving utility values produced in step (4) and the integer n. Thus, it also runs in polynomial time in the size of the original instance.
APPROXIMATE MAXIMIN SHARE ALLOCATIONS ON A CYCLE
We start with a simple observation that 1 2 -sufficient allocations always exist and, moreover, can be found in polynomial time. Proof. We remove any edge e from the cycle C and get a path, say P . The maximin share for each agent on P is at least half of the original maximin share for C. Indeed, let us consider an arbitrary agent i and her mms-split of C. By removing e, no more than one part of this split may break into two pieces. The value for the agent i of one of these pieces is at least 1 2 mms(i). We adjoin the other piece, if it is present, to its neighboring part in the mms-split of C. In this way, we obtain a split of P . Clearly, in this split of P every piece is worth to i at least 1 2 mms(i), so the claim follows. Thus, a -sufficient allocation can be found by (1) removing any edge from the cycle, (2) applying to the resulting path the algorithm by Bouveret et al. [2] that constructs in polynomial time an mms-allocation for trees (cf. Theorem 3.5).
To find a better guarantee than 1 2 turns out to be non-trivial. We will show that it can be improved to ( √ 5 − 1)/2 ≈ 0.61803..., and that further improvements are possible if we restrict the number of agent types.
Let c be a positive real and let N = {1, . . . , n}, where n ≥ 2, be a set of agents with arbitrary utility functions u 1 , . . . , u n on a set of goods on a path, say P . Figure 4 shows an algorithm allocate that assigns to some (possibly all) agents in N bundles they value at c or more. 
allocate(N, P, Q, c)
% P is a path; we fix its direction so that prefixes of P are well defined % N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, is a set of agents, each with a utility function on P % c is a positive real % Q is a prefix of P valued at least c by at least one agent in N 1 S := {i ∈ N: there is an (n − 1)-split of P − Q that is c-strong for i}; 2 R := N − S; 3 j := 1; 4 while j ≤ n and P has value at least c for some i ∈ S ∪ R do 5 Q j := the shortest prefix of P worth at least c for some agent i ∈ R ∪ S 6 if Q j is worth at least c to an agent i ∈ R then 7 assign Q j to i; 8 R := R − {i} 9 else 10 assign Q j to an agent i ∈ S such that Q j is worth at least c for i; 11 S := S − {i}; 12 P := P − Q j ; 13 j := j + 1
FIGURE 4. Algorithm allocate
We will use this algorithm in our theoretical considerations on the existence of c-sufficient allocations. Under the restriction to rational-valued utilities and a rational c, the algorithm runs in polynomial time. We will use it to argue the existence of polynomial-time algorithms for constructing c-sufficient allocations.
First, let us discuss the algorithm allocate informally. The algorithm starts by defining a set S to consist of all agents i in N for whom an (n − 1)-split of P − Q that is c-strong for i can be found. The algorithm then sets R = N − S. We note that N = S ∪ R, S ∩ R = ∅ and that it may be that one of the sets S and R is empty.
Next, the algorithm sets j to 1 and proceeds to the loop (4-13). Each time the body of the loop is executed, it assigns a bundle to an "unassigned" agent. Throughout the execution of the loop, P denotes the path consisting of unallocated goods, and R ∪ S contains all agents that are as yet unassigned. In each iteration j, the algorithm attempts to allocate a bundle to an "unassigned" agent. At the start of that iteration j − 1 agents have received bundles selected as prefixes of the paths being considered in earlier iterations. If j > n, then the loop terminates and all agents are assigned bundles. If j ≤ n, some agents are unassigned, R∪S contains all unassigned agents and P is a path on unallocated goods. If the value of P for each unassigned agent is less than c, no further assignments are possible and the loop terminates. Otherwise P has value at least c for at least one unassigned agent and an assignment can be made. The bundle for the assignment, denoted by Q j is chosen as a shortest prefix of P that has value at least c for some unassigned agent. Selecting Q j as a prefix ensures that the remaining goods form a path. Selecting for Q j a shortest prefix that has value c or more for some unassigned agent is essential for a key property of the algorithm, which we will discuss later. Once the bundle Q j is constructed, it is assigned. By construction, there are unassigned agents that value Q j at c or more. We select one such agent, say i. We first check if such an agent i can be found in R and if so, assign Q j to i. Only if no agent in R values Q j at c or more, we select i from S (this selection is possible as at least one unassigned agent values Q j at c or more), and assign Q j to that i.
The following proposition gives the key property of the algorithm allocate.
Proposition 4.2. Let P be a path of goods and N = {1, . . . , n}, where n ≥ 2, a set of agents, each with a utility function on P , and c a positive real. Further, let Q be a prefix of P valued at least c by at least one agent in N, and S the set computed by the algorithm allocate(N, P, Q, c) in line (1) . When the algorithm allocate(N, P, Q, c) terminates, S = ∅, that is, all agents included in S in line (1) are assigned bundles they value at c or more.
Proof. We will denote by P 0 the original path P and by S 0 the set S as computed in line (1). Let us assume that when the algorithm allocate(N, P 0 , Q, c) terminates, S = ∅. Let i ∈ S. Since after line (1) the algorithm never includes elements in S, it follows that i ∈ S 0 . Let us consider the value, say j t of the variable j when the loop (4-13) terminates. Clearly, the body of the loop was executed j t −1 times and j t −1 agents are assigned bundles Q 1 , . . . , Q jt−1 . By the conditions on the input parameters, the body of the loop executes for j = 1 and defines a bundle Q 1 . This bundle is a prefix of Q (because of how we select prefixes Q j ). Since i ∈ S 0 , P 0 − Q has an (n − 1)-split that is c-strong for i. Since Q 1 is a prefix of Q, P 0 − Q 1 has an (n − 1)-split that is c-strong for i. Let us denote this split by D 2 , . . . , D n . Since i has not been assigned a bundle in iteration 1 (in any iteration, in fact) and D 2 has value at least c for i, at the beginning of iteration 2 we have that i ∈ S ∪ R and the value of the path P for i is at least c. Thus, the body of the loop executes for the second time. It follows that 3 ≤ j t . Further, since i is not assigned a bundle,
Let us assume that
It follows that in the iteration of the loop when j = j t , D jt ⊆ P . Thus, P has value at least c for i. Consequently, the body of the loop would execute for j = j t , a contradiction. Therefore, we have (
Let k be the smallest integer such that 3 ≤ k ≤ j t and (Q 1 ∪ . . .
Let P be the path of unallocated goods when j = k − 1, that is, P = P 0 − (Q 1 ∪ . . . ∪ Q k−2 ). It follows that D k−1 is a subpath of P . Let D be the shortest prefix of P containing D k−1 . It follows that D is a strictly shorter prefix of P than Q k−1 and D has value at least c to i. This is a contradiction with the algorithm selecting Q k−1 when j = k − 1.
Extending the notation we used for splits, we call an allocation q-strong if it assigns to each agent a bundle worth at least q to that agent. We note that for regular sets of agents, q-strong and q-sufficient allocations coincide. Theorem 4.3. Let P be a path of goods, N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, a regular set of agents, and c a real such that c ≤ 1. Further, let Q be a prefix of P valued at least c by at least one agent in N. Let R be the set computed by the algorithm allocate(N, P, Q, c) in line (2) . If no single good in P has value at least c for any agent in N and |R| ≤ 1−c c n + 1, then the algorithm allocate(N, P, Q, c) finds a c-strong allocation of goods in P to agents in N.
Proof. Let us assume that when the algorithm terminates, some agents are left without a bundle. Let us denote s = |S|, r = |R|, where S and R are computed in the lines (1) and (2) of the algorithm allocate(N, P, Q, c) and let k be the number of agents that have no bundle when the algorithm terminates. By Proposition 4.2, these agents are members of R. Moreover, by our assumption, k ≥ 1.
Let ℓ be an unassigned agent. Clearly, in each iteration that assigns a bundle to an agent from S, the value of that bundle is smaller than c for the agent ℓ (it is so because agents in R have a preference over agents in S when bundles are assigned). Moreover, in each iteration j when an agent from R is assigned a bundle, we recall this bundle is referred to as Q j , the value of Q j for the agent ℓ is smaller than 2c. Indeed, otherwise the prefix of Q j formed by removing the last node of Q j would have value at least c for ℓ (since, by assumption, that node is worth less than c to ℓ). This contradicts the property that Q j is a shortest prefix of the path P in the iteration j.
It follows that the total value for ℓ of all bundles constructed and allocated by the algorithm is less than cs + 2c(r − k). Consequently, the value for ℓ of all unallocated goods when the algorithm terminates, say v ℓ , satisfies v ℓ > n − cs − 2c(r − k) (since N is a regular collection of agents, for every agent in N, the total value of goods on P to that agent is n) 
Then, there is a c-sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents in N.
Proof. By Proposition 2.3, it suffices to show the result under the assumption that N is a regular collection of agents. In particular, c-sufficient allocations and c-strong allocations coincide. If some node x of C has value at least c to some agent j then a c-sufficient allocation exists. Indeed, we assign x to the agent j. By Proposition 3.8, the values of the maximin shares for the remaining n − 1 agents and the path C − x do not drop. Applying the algorithm of Bouveret at al. [2] , we construct an mms-allocation of goods on the path C − x to those n − 1 agents. This allocation together with an assignment of x to the agent j is a c-sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents in N (j receives a bundle worth at least at c and all other agents receive bundles worth at least their maximin share). So, we assume that no single-element bundle is c-sufficient for any agent in N.
For every agent i ∈ N we select any of her mms-splits of C. By regularity, all bundles in these splits are non-empty. Thus, each selected split can be obtained by removing n different edges, say e i 1 , . . . , e i n , from C. We arrange all edges e i j , i, j = 1, . . . , n, into a sequence E = e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e n 2 −1 . To this end, we start in any place in C and inspect the edges of C moving clockwise. Each time we find an edge e used to obtain mms-splits for, say, k agents, we place k occurrences of e in the sequence.
For an integer d = n, n + 1, . . ., we define
We then define p to be that integer d ≥ n, for which f (d) achieves its maximum (in case of ties we pick for p the smallest of those values d). Since f (n) > 1/2 and, for d ≥ n 2 , f (d) ≤ 1/n, it follows that n ≤ p < n 2 . It is also clear that f (p) = c (as defined in the statement of the theorem). Moreover, c ≤ n ⌈n 2 /p⌉+n−2 ≤ 1.
Let us define
and r = n 2 − p · h. Clearly, we have h ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ r < p.
We define a split of the cycle C into p parts (some of them possibly empty) by removing p edges e i , where i = 0, h, 2h, . . . , rh, rh + h, rh + 2h, . . . , rh + (p − r − 1)h. It is easy to check that between two consecutive removed edges there are h − 1 or h − 1 edges of the sequence E. Let Q be a part of this split with the largest value to agent n (any other agent could be chosen for n, too). This value is at least n p ≥ f (p) = c. Let P be the path obtained from C by removing an edge so that Q is a prefix of P . We will show that the call allocate(N, P, Q, c) produces a c-strong allocation for N.
First, we note that Q contains at most h − 1 edges of the sequence E. This means that there are at most h − 1 agents such that Q intersects more than one part of their mms-split. For each of the remaining agents their mms-split gives rise to an (n − 1)-split of the path P − Q that is 1-strong for them. Since c ≤ 1, these splits are c-strong for the corresponding agents and, consequently, all these agents are in S -the set defined in line (1) of the algorithm allocate(N, P, Q, c). It follows that |S| ≥ n − (h − 1). Let R be the set defined in line (2) of allocate(N, P, Q, c). Clearly, |R| = n − |S| ≤ h − 1. Hence, by the definition of p,
By Theorem 4.3, there is a c-strong allocation for P . This allocation is also a c-strong allocation for C.
This result yields a corollary that displays a specific value c for which the existence of c-sufficient allocations of goods on cycles is guaranteed. Let
Corollary 4.5.
For any number n of agents there is a ψ-sufficient allocation for a cycle.
Proof. Clearly, the corollary holds for n = 1, so we assume that n ≥ 2. Since ⌊ϕn⌋ ≥ n, by Theorem 4.4, it suffices to show that
where d = ⌊ϕn⌋. Clearly, n ⌊ϕn⌋ ≥ n ϕn = ψ. Thus, it remains to prove that
To this end, we observe that n 2 ≤ n 2 + n − 1 = (ϕn − 1)(ψn + 1), so
We now turn our attention to the problem of c-sufficient allocations when some agents have the same utility function, that is, are of the same type. Specifically, we will consider allocations of goods on cycles to n agents of at most t types. Lemma 4.6. Let C be a cycle of goods, N a regular set of agents, t ≥ 2 an integer, and N i , 1 ≤ i ≤ t, pairwise disjoint subsets of N such that -strong for agents in N i , for i = 1, 2, and there is a bundle in Π 1 and a bundle in Π 2 whose intersection has value at least t 2t−2 to some agent in N, then there is a t 2t−2 -strong allocation of goods on C to agents in N.
Proof. Let us define n = |N|, c t = t 2t−2 , and n i = |N i |, 1 ≤ i ≤ t. We will call agents in a set N i , 1 ≤ i ≤ t, to be of type i.
If there is a single good, say x, in C of value at least c t to some agent k ∈ N, then agent k receives x. It follows from Theorem 3.5 that there is an mms-allocation for the path C − x and the remaining n − 1 agents. We distribute the goods of C − x to these n − 1 agents according to this allocation. By Proposition 3.8, each agent i ∈ N \ {k} receives a bundle worth to her at least mms (n) (i). Since each agent is regular, for every i ∈ N we have mms (n) (i) = 1 ≥ c t . Thus, each agent in N is allocated a bundle worth at least c t to her. In other words, the allocation we constructed is c t -strong.
Thus, let us assume that no single good in C has value at least c t for any agent in N. Let Q be the intersection of two bundles A and B, where A is a bundle from Π 1 and B is a bundle from Π 2 , such that Q has value at least c t for some agent in N. It is clear that Q is a proper subpath of C. Let P be the path obtained from C by removing an edge so that Q is a prefix of P . We will consider the call allocate(N, P, Q, c t ) and follow the notation introduced in the description of the algorithm.
Since Q ⊆ A, B, all agents of types 1 and 2 are in S. It follows that |R| ≤ n − (n 1 + n 2 ). Since n 1 ≥ n 2 ≥ . . . ≥ n t , n 1 + n 2 ≥ 2n j , for j = 3, . . . , t. Thus, (t − 2)(n 1 + n 2 ) ≥ 2(n 3 + . . . + n t ) = 2(n − (n 1 + n 2 )).
Consequently, we have n 1 + n 2 ≥ 2 t n. We use this inequality to estimate |R| getting
By Theorem 4.3, there is a c t -strong allocation of goods on C to agents in N.
We will use this lemma to obtain a general result about the existence of c-sufficient allocations for any number of agents of t ≥ 4 types. Afterwards, we will obtain results for the two specific cases of t = 2 and t = 3. Theorem 4.7. Let C be a cycle of goods, N a set of agents of at most t types, where t ≥ 4. Then, a t 2t−2 -sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents in N exists.
Proof. By Proposition 2.3 we may assume that all agents in N are regular. Thus, we have that the maximin share for all agents is 1.
Let n 1 , . . . , n t be the numbers of agents of types 1, . . . , t, respectively, and let n = n 1 +. . .+n t be the number of all agents in N. As before, we define c t = t 2t−2 and assume that n 1 ≥ n 2 ≥ . . . ≥ n t . If all agents are of the same type, Proposition 2.1 ensures the existence of an mms-allocation. Since c t < 1, this mms-allocation is also a t 2t−2 -sufficient allocation. Thus, we assume that n 2 > 0 (and so, obviously, n 1 > 0, as well).
Let A 1 , . . . , A n and B 1 , . . . , B n be mms-splits of the cycle for agents of type 1 and 2, respectively. In particular, since c t < 1, the two splits are c t -strong for agents of type 1 and 2, respectively.
If for some i and j, where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the path A i ∩ B j has value at least c t to some agent in N, then we are done by Lemma 4.6. Indeed, by the regularity of the set of agents, c t -strong and c t -sufficient allocations coincide.
So, let us assume that no path A i ∩ B j has value c t or more to any agent. Then, in particular, A i ⊆ B j and B j ⊆ A i for all i and j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Thus, each of the sets A 1 , . . . , A n intersects exactly two consecutive sets of the mms-split B 1 , . . . , B n . We can assume without loss of generality that for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the set A i intersects the sets B i and B i+1 (the arithmetic on indices is modulo n, adjusted to the range [1..n]).
We claim that the mms-split A 1 , . . . , A n for agents of type 1 is a c t -sufficient split for agents of type 2. To prove it denote by u 2 the utility function for agents of type 2. Since for every i,
By our assumption the sets A i−1 ∩ B i and A i+1 ∩ B i+1 have value less than c t to any agent. Since for t ≥ 4 we have c t ≤ 2 3 , it follows that u 2 (A i ) > 2 − 2c t ≥ c t . We proved that A 1 , . . . , A n is a c t -strong split for any agent of type 2. As we noted, it is also a c t -strong split for agents of type 1. Therefore, we can take A 1 , . . . , A n for Π 1 and Π 2 in Lemma 4.6. Moreover, A 1 is clearly the intersection of a bundle in Π 1 with a bundle in Π 2 simply because A 1 is a bundle in each of these splits. Moreover, as A 1 , . . . , A n is an mms-split for agents of type 1, A 1 has value at least 1 and, consequently, at least c t for agents of type 1. Thus, the assumptions of Lemma 4.6 are satisfied and a c t -strong allocation exists. This completes the proof as c t -strong and c t -sufficient allocations coincide.
Next, we consider the case of agents of two types and show that 3 4 -sufficient allocations of goods on a cycle to n agents of two types are always possible. Later on we will present a result showing that 3 4 -sufficient allocations of goods on a cycle also exist when agents are of three types. The proof of this more general result is highly technical, complex and long (enough so that we provide it in an appendix). In contrast, the proof in the case of agents of two types is simple yet still of substantial interest in its own right to be presented. Theorem 4.8. Let C be a cycle of goods and N a set of agents of no more than two types. Then, a 3 4 -sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents in N exists.
Proof. By Proposition 2.3 we may assume that the set N of agents is regular. In particular, -sufficient allocations coincide. Let n be the number of agents and let n 1 and n 2 be the numbers of agents of type 1 and type 2, respectively. Clearly, n = n 1 + n 2 . We will write u 1 and u 2 for the utility functions for the agents of type 1 and type 2, respectively. Without loss of generality, we will assume that n 1 ≥ n 2 . If n 2 = 0, then all agents are of the same type and an mms-allocation (or, equivalently, a 1-sufficient allocation) exists by Proposition 2.1. This implies the assertion. Therefore, we will assume that n 2 > 0. Consequently, n 1 > 0, too.
Let A 1 , . . . , A n and B 1 , . . . , B n be mms-splits for agents of type 1 and type 2, respectively. If some set A i ∩ B j , where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, is of value at least 3 4 to some agent, then we allocate this set A i ∩ B j to this agent. Let P = C − (A i ∩ B j ). Clearly, P is a path. Moreover, since every bundle in the split A 1 , . . . , A n other than A i is included in P , mms (n−1) (P, u 1 ) ≥ mms (n) (C, u 1 ) = 1. Similarly, we have mms (n−1) (P, u 2 ) ≥ 1. Thus, we can assign the goods in P to the remaining n − 1 agents so that each agent receives a bundle that she values at least at 1. To this end, we may use the algorithm by Bouveret et al. [2] (cf. Theorem 3.5). The resulting allocation of goods on C is 3 4 -strong and so, 3 4 -sufficient. Therefore, we assume from now on that no set A i ∩ B j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, is of value 3 4 or more for any of the agents. In particular, A i ⊆ B j and B j ⊆ A i for all i and j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that each set A i has a nonempty intersection with the sets B i and B i+1 (addition modulo n adjusted for [1. .n]) and with no other set B j .
We will show that the sets A 1 , . . . , A n can be allocated so that each agent receives a set of value at least 3 4 to this agent. Suppose that fewer than n 2 of the sets A 1 , . . . , A n have value at least 3 4 to agents of type 2. Then, there are two sets A i , A i+1 such that each of them is valued at less than 3 4 by agents of type 2. Thus, we have
This inequality implies that at least one of the sets A i−1 ∩ B i and A i+2 ∩ B i+2 has value larger that 3 4 for agents of type 2, a contradiction. It follows that at least n 2 of the sets A 1 , . . . , A n are of value at least 3 4 to agents of type 2. Since there are at most n 2 agents of this type (we recall that n 1 ≥ n 2 ), we have sufficiently many such sets for them. The remaining sets are allocated to agents of type 1. The resulting allocation is 3 4 -strong and so, also Figure 5 . It is easy to check that in this case 3 4 -sufficient allocation exists but c-sufficient allocation for c > 3 4 does not. As we pointed out above, the 3 4 fraction of maximin shares can be guaranteed in a more general setting when agents are of three types. Specifically, the following theorem holds. We provide its proof in the appendix. Theorem 4.9. Let C be a cycle of goods and N a set of agents of at most three types. Then, a 3 4 -sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents in N exists.
Theorem 4.9 is tight too. In Figure 6 we present an example where a 3 4 -sufficient allocation of goods on a cycle exists but there is no c-sufficient allocation for any c > An interesting property of the example in Figure 6 is that the set {0, 1, 2} of values of the utility functions is very small. The problem of existence and construction of an mms-allocation with this set of values was studied in the original version of the mms-allocation problem (i.e. for complete graphs in our terminology). Amanatidis et al. [1] proved that unlike in the case of a cycle (see Figure 6 ) for a complete graph an mms-allocation with {0, 1, 2} as the set of values of the utility functions always exists.
It is also easy to show that if {0, 1} is the set of values of the utility functions, then an mmsallocation for a cycle always exists and can be constructed in polynomial time. An analogous statement for complete graphs was observed earlier by Bouveret and Lemaître [4] .
As we have seen earlier, even for three agents mms-allocations of goods on a cycle may not exist. Theorem 4.9 implies that when allocating goods on a cycle to three agents, we can guarantee that each agent receives a bundle worth at least 3 4 of her maximin share. We will now show that this guarantee can be strengthened to 5 6 . Re-examining the example in Figure 2 shows that this is the best guarantee we can get. To see this, we recall that in this case the maximin share value for agents 1 and 2 is 5 and for agent 3 is 6. In particular, any split in which an agent 1 or 2 obtains a bundle consisting of two or fewer items is at best a 4 5 -sufficient allocation (indeed, any two consecutive items have the total value of no more than 4). Thus, in any c-sufficient allocation with c ≥ 5 6 , agents 1 and 2 receive bundles of at least three items. If agent 3 receives at least three items, then all agents obtain bundles of exactly three items. There are only three such allocations. It is easy to see that one of them is 4 5 -sufficient and the other two are 5 6 -sufficient. Since any two consecutive items have the total value at most 5 for agent 3, any allocation in which agent 3 receives no more than 2 items is at best 5 6 -sufficient (some of them are actually 5 6 -sufficient; for instance, the allocation
To show that a 5 6 -sufficient allocation of goods on a cycle always exists for 3 agents we start by introducing some additional terminology and two lemmas. Let C be a cycle, N = {1, 2, 3} a set of agents and u i the utility function of an agent i = 1, 2, 3. To simplify notation, we call an mms-split for (C, 3, u i ) an mms(i)-split and we recall that we write mms(i) as a shorthand for mms (3) (C, u i ).
Lemma 4.10. Let C be a cycle and N = {1, 2, 3} a set of agents. Let c, 0 < c ≤ 1, be a real number. If for some agent i ∈ N two different bundles of an mms(i)-split of C are of value at least c · mms(j) to an agent j, where j = i, then there is a c-sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents in N.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that i = 1 and j = 2. Let us observe that for any agent and any 3-split of the cycle there is a bundle of value at least one third of the total value of all goods for this agent. The value of this bundle is larger than or equal to the maximin share for this agent. In particular, the value of one of the bundles of any mms(1)-split is greater than or equal to mms(3). The following protocol finds a c-sufficient allocation. Agent 3 picks a bundle of the mms(1)-split that has value at least mms(3) to her. At least one of the remaining two bundles has value at least c · mms(2) to agent 2. That bundle is allocated to agent 2. The remaining bundle of the split is assigned to agent 1.
Lemma 4.11. Let C be a cycle and N = {1, 2, 3} a set of agents. Let c, 0 < c ≤ 1, be a real number. If for some two different agents i, j ∈ N, the intersection of a bundle of an mms(i)-split and a bundle of an mms(j)-split of C has value at least c · mms(i) to the agent i, then there is a c-sufficient allocation of goods in C to agents in N.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that i = 1 and j = 2. Let A and B be bundles of mms-splits for agents 1 and 2, respectively, such that Q = A ∩ B has value at least c · mms(1) to the agent 1. The set B − Q consists of one or two intervals, the latter in the case when A ⊂ B.
Clearly, the elements in B − Q can be added to the remaining two bundles (different from B) of the mms(2)-split so that to form a 2-split of C − Q, say B ′ , B ′′ , with both parts of value at least mms(2) for the agent 2.
We construct a c-sufficient allocation as follows. If u 3 (Q) ≥ c · mms(3), then we allocate Q to agent 3. Since Q ⊆ A, C − Q contains the remaining two bundles (different from A) of the mms(1)-split. Hence, u 1 (C − Q) ≥ 2 · mms(1). Since C − Q = B ′ ∪ B ′′ , at least one of the bundles B ′ and B ′′ is worth mms(1) or more to the agent 1. We allocate that bundle to that agent and we allocate the remaining one to the agent 2.
If u 3 (Q) < c · mms (3), then the agent 1 gets Q. Since u 3 (C) ≥ 3 · mms(3) and c ≤ 1, u 3 (C − Q) > 2 · mms(3). Thus, at least one bundle of B ′ and B ′′ is worth mms(3) or more to agent 3. That bundle goes to the agent 3 and the remaining one to agent 2.
We are now ready to prove that if goods on a cycle are allocated to three agents, then each agent can be guaranteed a bundle worth at least 5 6 of her maximin share.
Theorem 4.12. Let C be a cycle and N = {1, 2, 3} a set of agents. Then, a 5 6 -sufficient allocation of goods in C to agents in N exists.
Proof. Because of Proposition 2.3, we restrict attention to the case when the set N of agents is regular. It follows that each agent values all goods on C at 3 and that all agents are proportional. In particular, mms(i) = 1, for every agent i ∈ N.
Let
, B 3 and Π 3 = C 1 , C 2 , C 3 be mms-splits for agents 1, 2 and 3, respectively. If a bundle of one of these splits is contained in a bundle of another split, then an mms-allocation (and consequently a 5 6 -sufficient allocation) exists, by Lemma 4.11 (applied to the two bundles and c = 1).
From now on we assume that there are no such containments. Then, we can relabel the parts of the splits Π 1 , Π 2 and Π 3 so that the sets A ⌈(k+2)/3⌉ ∩ B ⌈(k+1)/3⌉ ∩ C ⌈k/3⌉ , k = 1, 2, . . . , 9 (indices are computed modulo 3 with respect to the set {1, 2, 3}) form a split of the cycle. Let us call these 9 sets chunks.
Since each agent i ∈ N values C at 3, any split of C into three bundles contains at least one bundle of value at least 1 to i, that is, of value at least mms(i) to i. In particular, such a bundle can be found in the mms-splits of the two agents other than i. Moreover, if for some two agents i, j ∈ N, i = j, more than one part in Π i has value at least 1 (= mms(j)) for j, then we are done by Lemma 4.10.
Let i, j, k ∈ N be three different agents. We observe that if a bundle of Π k of value at least 1 (= mms(i)) for the agent i is different from a part of Π k of value at least 1 (= mms(j)) for the agent j, then we can easily distribute the parts of Π k among the agents to get an mms-allocation.
So, we assume that for every agent i there is a unique bundle in Π i whose value for each of the remaining two agents is at least 1. Let us call this bundle i-significant.
One can readily observe that, for i, j ∈ N, i = j, the intersection of the i-significant bundle and the j-significant bundle consists of either two chunks, one chunk or is empty. Moreover, it is not possible for each of the three pairs of different significant bundles to intersect on one chunk. Thus, there is a pair i, j ∈ N of agents such that the i-significant bundle and the j-significant bundle are disjoint or intersect on two chunks. We will consider these two cases separately. Clearly, we can assume without loss of generality that i = 1, j = 2 and that A s and B t , s, t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are the 1-significant and 2-significant bundles, respectively, Case 1 A s and B t are disjoint.
We will not lose generality, either, if we assume that A s = A 1 and B t = B 2 . Let us consider the mms-split Π 3 . By the definition of significant bundles, the value for the agent 3 of each of the sets A 1 and B 2 is at least 1.
If the value of A 2 or A 3 for the agent 3 is at least 5 6 , then a 5 6 -sufficient allocation exists by Lemma 4.10. Moreover, if the value for the agent 3 of the set A 1 ∩ C 3 is at least 5 6 , then a 5 6 sufficient allocation exists by Lemma 4.11.
So, let us assume that the values for the agent 3 of the sets A 2 , A 3 and A 1 ∩ C 3 are all smaller than 5 6 . Then the value of the chunk A 1 ∩ B 1 ∩ C 1 is larger than 3 − 3 ·
In a very similar way we show that if any of the sets B 1 , B 3 , B 2 ∩ C 2 has value at least 5 6 for the agent 3, then a 5 6 -sufficient allocation exists. Otherwise, the value for the agent 3 of the chunk A 2 ∩ B 2 ∩ C 1 is larger than 1 2 . Then, however, the value for the agent 3 of the part C 1 , which contains the chunks A 1 ∩ B 1 ∩ C 1 and A 2 ∩ B 2 ∩ C 1 is larger than 1, a contradiction because the agents are proportional. Case 2 A s and B t intersect on two chunks.
We assume without loss of generality that A s = A 1 and B t = B 1 . By the definition of significant bundles, the value for the agent 3 of each of the bundles A 1 and B 1 is at least 1.
Reasoning in exactly the same way as in the first case, we conclude that either a 5 6 -sufficient allocation exists or the value for the agent 3 of the chunk A 1 ∩ B 1 ∩ C 1 is larger than 1 2 . Let us then assume the latter. We observe that as in Case 1, if any of the bundles B 2 , B 3 , B 1 ∩ C 1 has value at least 5 6 for the agent 3, then a 5 6 -sufficient allocation exists (by Lemma 4.10 or 4.11). Otherwise, the value for the agent 3 of the chunk A 1 ∩ B 1 ∩ C 3 is larger than 1 2 . Then, however, the value for the agent 3 of the set
is larger than 1. In this case an mms-allocation exists because we can assign A 2 to the agent 1, B 3 ∪ (A 3 ∩ B 2 ∩ C 2 ) to the agent 2 and A 1 ∩ B 1 to the agent 3.
For more than three agents a 5 6 -sufficient allocation of goods on a cycle may not exist. The example in Figure 5 shows that this may be the case even for agents of two types only. For this example, we have already observed that there is a 3 4 -sufficient allocation but no c-sufficient allocation for c > 3 4 . We close this section by commenting on the problem of computing c-sufficient allocations. First, we note that all proofs we presented in this section, as well as the proof of Theorem 4.9, which we give in the appendix, yield algorithms for constructing c-sufficient allocations. These constructions apply to the case of regular sets of agents and require that both maximin shares and mms-splits be computed for every agent. Given those, the actual construction of a c-sufficient allocation provided in each proof can clearly be implemented to run in polynomial time. We recall that in the case of goods on a cycle, maximin shares and mms-splits can be computed in polynomial time. It follows then by Corollary 3.12 that in all cases we discussed in this section when c-sufficient allocations exist, they can be computed by algorithms running in polynomial times.
CONCLUSIONS
We investigated maximin share allocations in the graph setting for the fair division problem of indivisible goods proposed by Bouveret et al. [2] . That paper settled the case of trees by showing that maximin share allocations of goods on trees always exist and can be computed in polynomial time. It also gave an example of goods on a cycle to be distributed to four agents where no maximin share allocation exists.
Our work focused on cycles. We found several cases when maximin share allocations on cycles exist and can be found in polynomial time. For some other cases, when maximin share allocations are not guaranteed to exist, we found polynomial-time algorithms deciding the existence of maximin share allocations and, if they do exist, computing them, too. Interestingly, we do not know the complexity of deciding the existence of maximin share allocations on cycles. We proved that the problem is in NP but whether it is NP-hard is open.
In general, understanding the complexity of deciding the existence of maximin share allocations of goods on graphs is a major challenge. We improved an earlier upper bound from Σ P 2 down to ∆ P 2 but, as in the case of cycles, we do not have any hardness results. Establishing such results and characterizing classes of graphs for which deciding the existence of maximin share allocations is in P, is NP-complete or goes beyond NP (under the assumption, of course, that the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse) are important open problems.
Perhaps our most interesting results concern the existence of allocations guaranteeing each agent a given fraction of her maximin share. For instance, we show that for three agents one can always find an allocation giving each agent at least 5/6 of her maximin share. For an arbitrary number of agents of two or three types, we show allocations giving each agent 3/4 of the maximin share, and we also obtain some results for the case when the number of types is larger than three. Moreover, in each case, these allocations can be found by polynomial-time algorithms. We conjecture that in the general case of any number of agents there exist allocations guaranteeing all agents at least 3/4 of their maximin share. Theorems 4.8 and 4.9 show the conjecture holds if agents are of three or fewer types. However, the methods we developed so far seem too weak to prove it in full generality. APPENDIX -PROOF OF THEOREM 4.9
In this section we prove Theorem 4.9. We adhere to the notation we used throughout the paper. In particular, we consider a set N = {1, 2 . . . , n} of agents of three types and a cycle C of m goods.
In the proof, as in several other places in the paper, we work under the assumption that agents are regular. Thus, their mms-splits consist of non-empty bundles. Therefore, in our auxiliary results, concerning properties of splits, we restrict attention to splits into non-empty bundles, that is, to splits that are partitions.
We select and fix an element a in C and call it an anchor. Whenever we say that X = X 1 , . . . , X n is a split we we mean that it is a split of C and, assume that a ∈ X 1 and that parts X i are enumerated according to their location on the cycle as we traverse it clockwise. Further, for every i = 1, . . . , n, we write X i for the set of all elements in the segment of C extending from the anchor a clockwise to the last element of X i (inclusive). We also assume that arithmetic expressions appearing in indices labeling bundles in splits are evaluated modulo n; in particular, for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n, i + n = i. Finally, we call any set of a split X an X-set.
Assuming these conventions, let X = X 1 , . . . , X n and Y = Y 1 , . . . , Y n be two splits. A bundle X i is a jump to the split Y if X i ⊆ Y i . In such case, we will also say that X i is a jump to Y i+1 . We usually omit the reference to the target split of a jump, if it is clear from the context. The following property follows directly from the definition.
Lemma 5.1. Let X = X 1 , . . . , X n and Y = Y 1 , . . . , Y n be two splits. Then for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, at least one of the sets X i , Y i is a jump (to the other split).
Lemma 5.2. Let X = X 1 , . . . , X n and Y = Y 1 , . . . , Y n be two splits. If for some i, 1 ≤ i < n, X i is a jump and X i+1 is not a jump, then Y i+1 ⊆ X i+1 and Y i+1 is a jump.
Let X = X 1 , . . . , X n be a sequence of n subsets of C. An X -interval is any sequence X i , X i+1 . . . , X j of up to n consecutive elements of X (with X 1 being a successor of X n ).
Let X = X 1 , . . . , X n and Y = Y 1 , . . . , Y n be two splits. A sequence Z = Z 1 , . . . , Z n of subsets of C is X Y-useful if for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n, at least one of the following conditions holds:
(1)
Lemma 5.3. Let X = X 1 , . . . , X n and Y = Y 1 , . . . , Y n be splits. If a sequence Z = Z 1 , . . . , Z n is X Y-useful then the sets in Z are pairwise disjoint.
Proof. Let us consider sets Z i and Z j , where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. From the definition of a X Y-useful sequence, it follows that for every k,
In the first two cases, the sets Z i and Z j are disjoint, because they are two different members of a split. The other two cases are symmetric. Without loss of generality, we will restrict attention to the last one: Z i = Y i and Z j = X j .Clearly, we may assume that Z i = X i and Z j = Y j (otherwise, Z i and Z j would be members of the same split, the case we already considered). Let k be the largest integer such that i ≤ k < j, Z k = Y k , and
Let us assume then that i = 1. Since the anchor a belongs to Y 1 , Y 1 is the union of two segments, A = C \ Y n and B = Y 1 . Since X j ∩ Y k = ∅, X j ∩ B = ∅. Let p be the smallest integer such that j ≤ p ≤ n, Z p = X p and Z p+1 = X p+1 . Since Z j = X j and Z 1 = X 1 (we proved Z i = X i above and here i = 1), p is well defined. It follows that X p is a jump. Therefore,
Splits X and Y are proper relative to each other if for every X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y, X ⊆ Y and Y ⊆ X. The following lemma provides some basic properties of splits that are proper relative to each other (they are easy to see and we omit the proof).
Lemma 5.4. Let splits X = X 1 , . . . , X n and Y = Y 1 , . . . , Y n , with both sequences enumerated according to our convention clockwise starting with sets containing the anchor a, be proper relative to each other. Then for every i = 1, . . . , n,
From now on we consider splits that are mms-splits for a set N of regular agents. In particular, all agents are proportional and for every agent the total utility of all goods in C is n. We also use the following terminology. A subset X of C that induces in C a connected subgraph is acceptable to an agent x if the total value of the goods in X to x is at least 3 4 . Lemma 5.5. Let x and y be two regular agents from N. Let X and Y be mms-splits of a cycle for agents x and y, respectively, and let X and Y be proper relative to each other. If no set X ∩ Y , where X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y, is acceptable to y, then at least one of each pair of consecutive sets of X is acceptable to y.
Proof. To prove the lemma let us consider any two consecutive sets in X , say X and X ′ , with X ′ directly following X in X . Since X and Y are proper relative to each other, Lemma 5.4 implies that there are three consecutive sets
be the predecessor of X in X and the successor of X ′ in X , respectively. By our assumption,
, where u y is the utility function for agent y. It follows that
Thus, u y (X) ≥ 3 4 or u y (X ′ ) ≥ 3 4 , that is, at least one of X and X ′ is acceptable to y.
In the next lemma and in the proof of Theorem 4.9, we use the following notation. We write n 1 , n 2 , n 3 for the numbers of agents of types i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , respectively. In particular, n = n 1 + n 2 + n 3 . Further, we assume without loss of generality that n 1 ≥ n 2 ≥ n 3 ≥ 1.
Lemma 5.6. Let A = A 1 , . . . , A n (resp. B = B 1 , . . . , B n and C = C 1 , . . . , C n ) be mms-splits of the cycle C for agents of type i 1 (resp. i 2 and i 3 ). If n 1 = n 2 , n 3 ≥ 1, no set A i ∩ B j is acceptable to any agent, and some C-set is contained in some A-set or B-set, then there is a 3 4 -sufficient allocation for a cycle and any number of agents of three types.
Proof. Since no set A i ∩ B j is acceptable to any agent, we have that for every i and j, where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, A i ⊆ B j and B i ⊆ A j . Thus, the splits A and B are proper relative to each other.
Our assumptions do not distinguish between the splits A and B. Therefore, without loss of generality, we may assume that a C-set, say C k , is contained in an A-set, say A i . Let B j and B j+1 be two B-sets that intersect A i . It follows that
But then A i ∩ B j+1 would be acceptable to agents of type i 3 (and there is at least one such agent). This is a contradiction. Thus,
Without loss of generality, we may assume that the anchor a belongs to C k ∩ B j ∩ A i . Assuming the sets in the splits A, B and C are enumerated with respect to that anchor, we have k = j = i = 1, C 1 ⊆ A 1 and B 1 ⊆ A n ∪ A 1 . The latter implies (we recall that A and B are proper relative to each other and so, Lemma 5.4 applies) that for every i = 1, . . . , n,
In what follows we will be applying Lemmas 5.1 -5.5. We can do so, as we follow here the same convention for enumerating sets in splits with respect to the same fixed anchor. Case 1 Some two consecutive A-sets are jumps to C. If all A-sets are jumps to C, then the sequence
is AC-useful. Indeed, C 1 is a jump as it is a subset of A 1 (thus, C 1 ⊆ A 1 , in the notation we introduced to define jumps), and A 2n 1 +1 is a jump by assumption. By Lemma 5.3, all sets in Z are pairwise disjoint.
By assumption, no set A i ∩ B j is acceptable to any agent of type i 2 . Thus, by Lemma 5.5, some n 1 (= n 2 ) of different sets in the interval A 2 , . . . , A 2n 1 +1 in Z are acceptable to agents of type i 2 . We assign them to those agents. We assign the remaining n 1 sets in A 2 , . . . , A 2n 1 +1 to agents of type i 1 . Finally, we assign the sets C j , j = 1, 2n 1 + 2, . . . , n, to agents of type i 3 . In this way all agents are allocated sets that are acceptable to them. If there are any unallocated goods (Z does not have to cover all goods in C), they can be distributed to agents so that all agents receive bundles inducing in C a path. This, yields an assignment that is a 3 4 -sufficient allocation. So, assume that some of A-sets are not jumps. Since some two consecutive A-sets are jumps, there is an integer i such that A i−1 and A i are jumps and A i+1 is not. By Lemma 5.2, C i+1 is a jump and C i+1 ⊆ A i+1 . The latter property implies that we may relabel sets A i and C i so that A n−1 and A n are jumps and A 1 is not. Indeed, under this relabeling we have C 1 ⊆ A 1 , which we assumed to hold when we started the proof (of course, we also need to relabel sets B i correspondingly).
We now consider the case when C n 3 or C n 3 −1 is a jump. In the first case, we set
. . , C n 3 , A n 3 +1 , . . . , A n and, in the second case, Z = C n , C 1 , . . . , C n 3 −1 , A n 3 , . . . , A n−1 .
Since A n and A n−1 are jumps, in either case Z is AC-useful. Thus, by Lemma 5.3, its elements are pairwise disjoint. Reasoning as above, we distribute the sets A n 3 +1 , . . . , A n (respectively, A n 3 , . . . , A n−1 ) among 2n 1 agents of types i 1 and i 2 (since n = 2n 1 + n 3 , in each case there are 2n 1 sets in that sequence), and then allocate the remaining n 3 sets, all of them C-sets, to agents of type i 3 . Clearly, the resulting allocation (after possibly attaching goods not "covered" by Z to appropriate sets in Z) is 3 4 -sufficient. Next, let us assume that neither C n 3 nor C n 3 −1 is a jump. Then let k be the largest integer such that 1 ≤ k < n 3 − 1 and C k is a jump (such k exists because C 1 is a jump). Moreover, let ℓ be the smallest integer j such that n 3 < j ≤ n and C j is a jump, if such j exists, or ℓ = n, otherwise. Observe that the sequence
is AC-useful. Indeed, for k < j < ℓ the sets C j are not jumps. By Lemma 5.1, the sets A j , where k < j < ℓ are jumps. Since k < ℓ − (n 3 − k) < ℓ, A ℓ−(n 3 −k) is a jump. Moreover, C k is a jump based by our choice of k, C ℓ is a jump by our choice of ℓ, if ℓ is not assigned to n by default, and A n is a jump by assumption. By Lemma 5.3, all sets in Z are pairwise disjoint.
Clearly, if ℓ and n(= 2n 1 + n 3 ) have the same parity, then the numbers of sets in the intervals A k+1 , . . . , A ℓ−(n 3 −k) and A ℓ+1 , . . . , A n are even (the latter is present and needs to be considered only if ℓ < n). Moreover, the total number of sets in these two intervals is n − n 3 = 2n 1 = 2n 2 . By Lemma 5.5, we can select among these A-sets in Z n 1 (= n 2 ) sets that are acceptable to agents of type i 2 . We allocate these sets to those agents. We then allocate the remaining n 1 of these A-sets to the agents of type i 1 . Finally, agents of type i 3 receive the n 3 C-sets of Z. Extending Z to an allocation of C, yields an allocation that is 3 4 -sufficient. So, assume now that ℓ and n have different parity. In this case, we define ℓ ′ to be the smallest integer j such that n 3 < j ≤ n − 1 and C j is a jump, if such j exists, or ℓ ′ = n − 1 otherwise. Obviously, ℓ ′ = ℓ or ℓ ′ = n − 1, so in both cases ℓ ′ and n have different parity. Since A n−1 is a jump, the same reasoning as above yields that the sequence
is AC-useful. Thus, its elements are pairwise disjoint. Moreover, the A-intervals A k+1 , . . . , A ℓ ′ −(n 3 −k)+1 and A ℓ ′ +1 , . . . , A n−1 (if ℓ ′ < n − 1) consist of even numbers of sets and the total number of sets in these two intervals is 2n 1 = 2n 2 . Therefore, we can define 3 4 -sufficient allocation in a similar way as when ℓ and n have the same parity. Case 2 Some two consecutive C-sets are jumps to A. This case is symmetric to the previous one if we enumerate sets counterclockwise rather than clockwise. Indeed, if a C-set X is a jump to an A-set Y under the clockwise enumeration, then Y is a jump to X under the counterclockwise enumeration. Case 3 No two consecutive A-sets are jumps to C, and no two consecutive C-sets are jumps to A. Since C 1 ⊆ A 1 , C 1 is a jump. It follows that C n ∩ A 1 = ∅ as otherwise, C n would be a jump. In particular, C n ⊆ A n . Applying Lemma 5.2 repeatedly, yields that for all odd i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, C i ⊆ A i and for every even i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, A i ⊆ C i . Further, since C n ⊆ A n , it follows that n is even.
We will now show that the splits B and C are proper relative to each other. To this end, we need to show that for every i and j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, C i ⊆ B j and B j ⊆ C i . First, let us assume that C i ⊆ B j , for some i and j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. If A i ⊆ C i , then A i ⊆ B j , a contradiction as the splits A and B are proper relative to each other. If C i ⊆ A i , then C i ⊆ A i ∩ B j . Therefore, A i ∩ B j is acceptable to agents of type i 3 , a contradiction with the assumptions of the lemma. Thus, for every i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, C i ⊆ B j .
Next, let us assume that B j ⊆ C i , for some i and j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. If i is odd, then C i ⊆ A i . It follows that B j ⊆ A i , a contradiction with the fact that A and B are proper relative to each other. Thus, i is even, so
Let us assume that j = i. Since i is even,
a contradiction with what we already proved above. It follows that we must have j = i + 1. In this case we similarly get,
, a contradiction as in the case j = i. This completes the proof that for every i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, B j ⊆ C i , and show that the splits B and C are proper relative to each other.
Let us observe that
Since the splits B and C are proper relative to each other, Lemma 5.4 implies that for every i,
Let us suppose that some set B i ∩ C j , where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, is acceptable for agents of type i 2 . Then, there is i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that B i ∩ C i−1 or B i ∩ C i has this property.
Let us assume the former. We define a 3 4 -sufficient allocation as follows. We consider the sequence C i , C i+1 , . . . , C i+n 3 of n 3 + 1 C-sets. One of the sets C i , C i+1 contains an A-set and that set is assigned to an agent of type i 1 . The remaining n 3 sets of that sequence go to agents of type i 3 . The sequence B i−1 , B i−2 , . . . , B i−(2n 1 −2) contains at least n 1 − 1 sets acceptable for agents of type i 1 (Lemma 5.5). We select some n 1 −1 of such sets and assign them to agents of type i 1 . We allocate the remaining n 1 −1 sets from this sequence and the set B i ∩C i−1 to agents of type i 2 . In this way, all agents are allocated sets that are acceptable to them. Moreover, these sets are pairwise disjoint. Indeed, the sets C i+n 3 and B i−(2n 1 −2) do not overlap because i−(2n 1 −2) = i+n−2n 1 +2 = i+n 3 +2 (we recall that the arithmetic of indices is modulo n), and B i+n 3 +2 ⊆ C i+n 3 +1 ∪ C i+n 3 +2 . Thus, the assignment is a 3 4 -sufficient allocation. The latter case, when B i ∩ C i is acceptable to an agent of type i 2 can be handled similarly by considering sequences C i−1 , C i−2 , . . . , C i−(n 3 +1) and B i+1 , B i+2 , . . . , B i+2n 1 −2 .
Assume now that no set B i ∩ C j is acceptable for agents of type i 2 . By Lemma 5.5 one in every two consecutive sets of the mms-split C 1 , . . . , C n is acceptable for agents of type i 2 . Clearly, A n is a jump to the split C because C 1 ⊆ A 1 . Moreover, C n 3 ⊆ A n 3 or C n 3 +1 ⊆ A n 3 +1 . Therefore, C n 3 +j is a jump for some j ∈ {0, 1}. It follows that the sequence Z = C 1 , . . . , C n 3 +j , A n 3 +j+1 , . . . , A n is AC-useful. By the comment above, at least j sets in C 1 , . . . , C n 3 +j are acceptable to agents of type i 2 (since n 3 ≥ 1). We assign j of these sets to agents of type i 2 . The remaining n 3 sets of C 1 , . . . , C n 3 +j are assigned to agents of type i 3 . Next, the sets A n 3 +j+1 , . . . , A n are distributed among agents of types i 1 and i 2 . Agents of type i 2 take n 2 − j sets of this interval (there are this many sets acceptable to agents of type i 2 because n−n 3 −j 2
≥ n 2 − j). The agents of type i 1 receive the remaining n 1 sets of the A-interval. By construction, this allocation is Theorem 4.9. Let C be a cycle of goods and N a set of agents of at most three types. Then, a 3 4 -sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents in N exists.
Proof. We adhere to the notation from Lemma 5.6. Further, as there, we assume that n 3 ≥ 1 (otherwise, we are in the case of agents of two types settled by Theorem 4.8). We now consider several cases. In each case we assume that none of the cases considered earlier applies. Case 1. Some set A i ∩ B j is acceptable to some agent. In this case, the existence of a 3 4 -sufficient allocation follows directly from Lemma 4.6.
From now on, we assume Case 1 does not apply, that is, no set A i ∩ B j is acceptable to any agent. It follows that for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, A i ⊆ B j and B j ⊆ A i . Thus, the splits A and B are proper relative to each other. This means, in particular, that from now on we may apply Lemma 5.5 to splits A and B, as well as to B and A.
Case 2. Some C-set is contained in some A-set.
Given our comments above, Lemma 5.6 applies and we can assume that n 1 > n 2 ≥ n 3 . We can also assume without loss of generality that C 1 ⊆ A 1 . Then, the sets A n and C 1 are jumps.
If the set C n 3 is a jump too, then the sequence
is AC-useful. By Lemma 5.5 (which also applies now), at least ⌊
⌋ ≥ n 2 of the sets that form the sequence A n 3 +1 , . . . , A n are acceptable for agents of type i 2 . We assign n 2 of them to these agents. We assign the remaining n 1 sets of this interval to agents of type i 1 . Agents of type i 3 receive the sets C 1 , . . . , C n 3 . In this way, we construct a 3 4 -sufficient allocation. If C n 3 is not a jump, then let k be the largest integer such that 1 ≤ k < n 3 and C k is a jump (such k exists because C 1 is a jump). Moreover, let ℓ be the smallest integer j such that n 3 < j ≤ n and C j is a jump, if such j exists, or ℓ = n otherwise. We define
. . , C ℓ , A ℓ+1 . . . , A n and observe that it is AC-useful. Indeed, C k is a jump by the construction. Further, k < ℓ − (n 3 − k) < ℓ and for k < j < ℓ the sets C j are not jumps. Thus, A ℓ−(n 3 −k) is a jump by Lemma 5.1. Finally, if ℓ < n, C ℓ is a jump by the choice of ℓ and A n is a jump by assumption.
By Lemma 5.5, there are at least
− 1 > n 2 − 1 sets in the intervals A k+1 , . . . , A ℓ−(n 3 −k) and A ℓ+1 . . . , A n (the latter present only if ℓ < n) that are acceptable to agents of type i 2 . We assign n 2 of them to these agents. The remaining sets of these intervals (there are n 1 of them) are assigned to agents of type i 1 . Finally, agents of type i 3 receive the sets in the intervals C 1 , . . . , C k and C ℓ−(n 3 −k)+1 , . . . , C ℓ . This yields a 3 4 -sufficient allocation. Case 3. Some A-set is contained in some C-set.
Without loss of generality we may assume that A 1 ⊆ C 1 . Since no C-set is contained in an A-set (that possibility is excluded by Case 2), a simple inductive argument shows that for every i = 2, . . . , n, A i ends strictly before C i does. In particular, A n ends strictly before C n does. This implies that A 1 ∩ C n = ∅, a contradiction with A 1 ⊆ C 1 (and the fact that different sets in a split are disjoint).
Given Cases 2 and 3, from now on we may assume that the splits A and C are proper relative to each other. Case 4. Some set A i ∩ C j is acceptable to agents of type i 3 .
As we noted, we may assume that the splits A and C proper are relative to each other. Thus, we can relabel the sets in the split C if necessary so that for all i, A i ⊆ C i ∪ C i+1 and, consequently, also
We can assume without loss of generality that A 1 ∩ C 1 or A n ∩ C 1 is acceptable to agents of type i 3 . Let us assume the former. We allocate A 1 ∩ C 1 and the sets C 2 , C 3 , . . . , C n 3 to agents of type i 3 . Clearly, all these sets are included in A 1 ∪ . . . ∪ A n 3 . The sequence A n 3 +1 , . . . , A n of the remaining A-sets contains n 1 + n 2 sets. By Lemma 5.5, at least
≥ n 2 of them are acceptable for agents of type i 2 . We allocate any n 2 of those sets to agents of type i 2 and the remaining n 1 of them to the agents of type i 1 . The allocation we defined in this way extends to a 3 4 -sufficient allocation for C.
The other case, when A n ∩ C 1 is acceptable to agents of type i 3 , can be handled similarly by considering sequences C n , C n−1 , . . . , C n−n 3 +2 and A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n−n 3 .
Excluding Cases 1-4 means in particular that A and C are proper relative to each other and that no set A i ∩ C j is acceptable to agents of type i 3 . Therefore, from now on we may apply Lemma 5.5 also to the splits A and C.
Let A i be any A-set acceptable to an agent of type i 3 . Such sets exist by Lemma 5.5. Without loss of generality we may assume that A n is acceptable to an agent of type i 3 . By Lemma 5.5, the sequence A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A 2n 2 contains n 2 sets that are acceptable to agents of type i 2 . We allocate these sets to them. Next, we consider the sequence A 2n 2 +1 , A 2n 2 +2 , . . . , A n−1 of n−1−2n 2 sets that follow A 2n 2 . Since n 1 ≥ ⌊ ⌋ ≥ n 3 −1. By Lemma 5.5, it follows that some n 3 − 1 sets in the sequence A 2n 2 +1 , A 2n 2 +2 , . . . , A n−1 are acceptable to agents of type i 3 . We allocate these sets and the set A n to agents of type i 3 . We allocate the remaining n 1 sets in A 1 , . . . , A n to agents of type i 1 . This defines a -sufficient allocation for C. Case 6. Some set A i ∩ C j is acceptable to agents of type i 1 and n 1 > n 2 .
By the same argument as in Case 4, we may assume that C i ⊆ A i−1 ∪ A i for all i and that A 1 ∩ C 1 or A n ∩ C 1 is acceptable to agents of type i 1 . If A 1 ∩ C 1 is acceptable to agents of type i 1 , we proceed as follows. We allocate the sets C 2 , C 3 , . . . , C n 3 +1 to agents of type i 3 . Next, we note that every other set in the sequence A n 3 +2 , A n 3 +3 , . . . , A n is acceptable to agents of type i 2 . Since the sequence contains n − n 3 − 1 = n 1 + n 2 − 1 ≥ 2n 2 sets (recall that we assume here that n 1 > n 2 ), some n 2 of the sets in the sequence are acceptable to agents of type i 2 . We allocate these n 2 sets to agents of type i 2 . We allocate the remaining n 1 − 1 sets in that sequence and the set A 1 ∩ C 1 to agents of type i 1 . In this way, all agents get sets that are acceptable to them. Further, we note that C 2 ∪ . . . ∪ C n 3 +1 ⊆ A 1 ∪ . . . ∪ A n 3 +1 . It follows that all sets used in the allocation are pairwise disjoint and so give rise to a 3 4 -sufficient allocation for C. The case when A 1 ∩ C n is acceptable to an agent of type i 1 follows from the one we just considered by the same argument as that used in Case 4.
Case 7. Some C-set is contained in some B-set.
By Lemma 5.6, we can assume that n 1 > n 2 (because Case 1 is excluded, A and B are proper relative to each other and no set A i ∩ B j is acceptable to any agent). We now recall that splits C and A are proper relative to each other. Moreover, no set A i ∩ C j is acceptable for agents of type i 1 (Case 6 is excluded). Thus, Lemma 5.5 applies to splits C and A and implies that every pair of consecutive sets of the mms-split C 1 , . . . , C n contains at least one set acceptable to agents of type i 1 .
We can assume without loss of generality that C 1 ⊆ B 1 . It follows that the sets B n and C 1 are jumps. If the set C 2n 3 is a jump, then the sequence Z 1 = C 1 , . . . , C 2n 3 , B 2n 3 +1 , . . . , B n is BC-useful. Similarly, if the set C 2n 3 −1 is a jump, then the sequence Z 2 = C 1 , . . . , C 2n 3 −1 , B 2n 3 , . . . , B n is BC-useful. Assume now that the sets C 2n 3 −1 and C 2n 3 are not jumps. Let k, 1 ≤ k < 2n 3 − 1, be the largest index such that C k is a jump (since C 1 is a jump, k is well defined), and let ℓ be the smallest integer j such that 2n 3 < j ≤ n and C j is a jump, if such j exists, or ℓ = n otherwise.
We observe that the sequence Z 3 = C 1 , . . . , C k , B k+1 , . . . , B ℓ−(2n 3 −k) , C ℓ−(2n 3 −k)+1 , . . . , C ℓ , B ℓ+1 . . . , B n is BC-useful. In particular the set B ℓ−(2n 3 −k) is a jump. Indeed, k < ℓ − (2n 3 − k) < ℓ and for k < j < ℓ the sets C j are not jumps. By Lemma 5.1, the sets B j are jumps. It can be shown similarly that the sequence Z 4 = C 1 , . . . , C k , B k+1 , . . . , B ℓ−(2n 3 −k)+1 , C ℓ−(2n 3 −k)+2 , . . . , C ℓ , B ℓ+1 . . . , B n is BC-useful. We now observe that the sequence Z 1 is a special case of the sequence Z 3 for k = 2n 3 , and the sequence Z 2 is a special case of the sequence Z 4 for k = 2n 3 − 1. Thus, to complete this case, it is enough to describe allocations based on sequences Z 3 and Z 4 .
For k even, we construct an allocation based on the sequence Z 3 which, we recall is BC-useful. Since no set A i ∩C j is acceptable for agents of type i 1 , by Lemma 5.5 half of the sets C 1 , . . . , C k and half of the sets C ℓ−(2n 3 −k)+1 , . . . , C ℓ (the number of sets in each of these intervals is even), n 3 sets in total, are acceptable for agents of type i 1 . We allocate these sets to agents of type i 1 . Agents of type i 3 receive the remaining n 3 sets from these intervals. Since at least every other set of the intervals B k+1 , . . . , B ℓ−(2n 3 −k) and B ℓ+1 . . . , B n in Z 5 is acceptable for agents of type i 1 (by Lemma 5.5), these two intervals contain at least ≥ n 1 +1) that are acceptable to agents of type i 1 . We allocate n 1 − n 3 of these sets to the agents of type i 1 that have not been allocated any set in the previous stage. The remaining sets, there are n 2 of them, are allocated to agents of type i 2 . Clearly, this allocation gives rise to a 3 4 -sufficient allocation for C. For k odd, we construct an allocation based on the BC-useful sequence Z 4 . By the same argument as above, at least ⌊ k 2 ⌋ of the sets C 1 , . . . , C k and at least ⌊ ⌋ of the sets C ℓ−(2n 3 −k)+2 , . . . , C ℓ are acceptable for agents of type i 1 . Since k is odd, the total number of sets in the two sequences that are acceptable to agents of type i 1 is at least k−1 2 + 2n 3 −k−1 2 = n 3 −1. We select some n 3 −1 of these sets and allocate them to n 3 −1 agents of type i 1 . The number of sets remaining in the two sequences is n 3 . We allocate them to agents of type i 3 . Moreover, the intervals B k+1 , . . . , B ℓ−(2n 3 −k)+1 and B ℓ+1 . . . , B n contain at least − n 3 ≥ n 1 − n 3 + 1 sets that are acceptable to agents of type i 1 (as before, we use the fact that n 2 ≥ n 1 + 1). We allocate some n 1 − n 3 + 1 of these sets to agents of type i 1 that have not been allocated a set before. Finally, we allocate the remaining sets in these two sequences, there are n 2 of them, to agents of type i 2 . This allocation gives rise to a 3 4 -sufficient allocation for C. From now on, we will assume that no C-set is included in any B-set. Reasoning as in Case 3, we can prove that also no B-set is included in any C-set. Thus, in the remaining part of the proof we may assume that the splits B and C are proper relative to each other. Case 8. Some set B i ∩ C j is acceptable to agents of type i 3 . Since the splits B and C are proper relative to each other, we may relabel the sets if necessary so that for all i, B i ⊆ C i ∪ C i+1 , and that B 1 ∩ C 1 or B n ∩ C 1 is acceptable for agents of type i 3 . We will consider the first case, that is, that B 1 ∩ C 1 is acceptable to agents of type i 3 . As in several places before, the other case can be handled in a similar way.
Suppose first that n 1 > n 2 . Since the conditions formulated in Cases 1 and 6 are not satisfied, by Lemma 5.5 every other set in mms-splits B and C is acceptable to agents of type i 1 (recall that B and A are proper relative to each other and so are C and A). Thus, there are at least n 3 − 1 sets in the interval C 2 , C 3 , . . . , C 2n 3 −1 that are acceptable to agents of type i 1 . We allocate these sets to those agents. We allocate the remaining n 3 − 1 the sets in this sequence and the set B 1 ∩ C 1 to agents of type i 3 . Similarly, we note that the sequence B 2n 3 , B 2n 3 +1 , . . . , B n contains at least n−2n 3 +1 2 ≥ n 2 − n 3 ≥ n 1 − n 3 + 1 sets that are acceptable to agents of type i 1 . We allocate some n 1 − n 3 + 1 of such sets to those agents of type i 1 that have not yet been allocated a set. The remaining sets in the sequence, there are n 2 of them, are allocated to agents of type i 2 . All sets in the assignment are pairwise disjoint as B 2n 3 ⊆ C 2n 3 ∪ C 2n 3 +1 . Thus, the assignment we defined gives rise to a 3 4 -sufficient allocation for C. Thus, assume that n 1 = n 2 . In this case agents of type i 3 receive B 1 ∩ C 1 and the sets C 2 , C 3 , . . . , C n 3 . Agents of types i 1 and i 2 distribute among themselves the sets B n 3 +1 , B n 3 +2 , . . . , B n . This is possible as the number of those sets is even, in fact, equal to 2n 1 (= 2n 2 ), and every other set of this sequence is acceptable for agents of type i 1 . Since B n 3 +1 ⊆ C n 3 +1 ∪ C n 3 +2 , these sets are disjoint with the sets assigned to agents of type i 3 and, clearly, they are pairwise disjoint themselves. It follows that this allocation gives rise to a 3 4 -sufficient allocation for C. Case 9. None of the conditions formulated in Cases 1-8 holds. We may assume that any pair of splits A, B, C are proper relative to each other. Moreover, relabeling the sets if necessary, we may also assume that A i ⊆ C i ∪ C i+1 and B i ⊆ C i ∪ C i+1 . Thus, A i and B i overlap and, consequently, A i ⊆ B i ∪ B i+1 or A i ⊆ B i−1 ∪ B i . Both cases can be dealt with similarly, so we assume that A i ⊆ B i ∪ B i+1 .
We note that for every i
The value of C i ∪ C i+1 ∪ C i+2 for agents of type i 3 is 3. The conditions formulated in Cases 1, 4 and 8 do not hold, so the sets A i−1 ∩ C i , A i+1 ∩ B i+1 and B i+2 ∩ C i+2 are not acceptable for agents of type 3. Thus, the value of A i for agents of type i 3 is larger than 3 − 3 · . As i was arbitrary, it follows that every A-set is acceptable for agents of type i 3 .
We have n 2 ≤ n 1 < n 2
, where the latter inequality holds because of Case 5 being excluded. Since at least one in every two consecutive sets A i , A i+1 is acceptable to agents of type i 2 , we assign n 2 of such sets to agents of type i 2 . All remaining A-sets are acceptable for agents of types i 1 and i 3 . Thus, they can be allocated among them arbitrarily yielding a
